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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Inrecentyearsfactoringhasexperiencedphenomenalgrowthandhasbecomeanimportant sourceof
financing—especially short term working capital—for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and
corporations, reaching a worldwide volume of 760 billion euro in 2003. Although the importance of
factoring varies considerably around the world, it occurs in most countries and is growing especially
quickly in many developing countries. This paper explores the advantages of factoring over other
types of lending for firms in developing economies, and discusses the informational, legal, tax and
regulatory barriers to its growth. It also examines the role of factoring in the eight Eastern European
countries that became EU members on May 1, 2004—the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, referred to as the EU 8.
Factoring is a form of asset-based finance where the credit extended is based on the value of the
borrower’s accounts receivable—that is, the payments owed by the borrower’s customers. Unlike
the other main form of asset-based finance, asset-based lending, the receivables are purchased by
the factor rather than used as collateral in a loan. That is, under factoring, title and ownership of
the receivables shifts from the seller to the factor. Factoring also typically involves more than just
financing and generally includes two other services: credit and collections.
This bundling of services is one of factoring’s advantages over other types of lending, particularly
for SMEs that do not have the expertise or resources to manage their credit and collection activities.
Factoring is also useful for providing financing to high-risk, informationally opaque borrowers, be-
cause underwriting is based on the risk of the borrower’s accounts—not the risk of the borrower.
Thus factoring may be especially well-suited to financing receivables from large or foreign companies
more creditworthy than the factoring client. Finally, factoring can play an important role in financial
systems with weak commercial laws, contract enforcement, and bankruptcy systems. Under such
conditions the virtue of factoring is that factored receivables are removed from the bankruptcy estate
of the borrower and become the property of the factor.
This paper starts by summarizing factoring’s distinguishing features, origins, and mechanics. It
then examines factoring’s role in the international financial landscape, including how it compares
with other lending products for SMEs. The paper then analyzes issues that drive the importance of
these products around the globe, including countries’ information infrastructure, legal and judicial
frameworks, and tax and regulatory environments. After that the paper focuses on the EU 8, assess-
ing conditions that will foster—or undermine—the development of the factoring industry in these
countries. The paper concludes that factoring offers key advantages over other lending products
and is likely to become more important in these countries, and suggests policies to accelerate its
development.
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WHAT IS FACTORING?
Around the world, factoring is the dominant form of asset-based finance and an important source
of external financing for corporations and small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). Under asset-
based finance the credit provided by a lender is explicitly linked on a formula basis to the value of
a borrower’s underlying (working capital) assets, not the borrower’s overall creditworthiness. This
explicit link is continuously managed so that the value of the underlying assets always exceeds the
amount of the credit. In factoring the underlying assets are the borrower’s accounts receivable—that
is,salepaymentsduefromcustomers—whichthefactor(lender)purchasesatadiscount.Forexample,
a seller (borrower) might receive from a factor 70 percent of the value of an account receivable, and
the remaining 30 percent (less interest and service fees) upon receiving payment from the customer.1
In developing countries factoring offers several advantages over other types of lending. First,
factoringmaybeparticularlyusefulincountrieswithweaksecuredlendinglaws,inefficientbankruptcy
systems,andimperfectrecordsofupholdingseniorityclaims,becausefactoredreceivablesarenotpart
of the estate of a bankrupt SME. Second, in a factoring relationship the credit is primarily based on
quality of the underlying accounts—not the quality of the borrower. Thus factoring may be especially
attractive to high-risk SMEs. Factoring can mitigate the problem of borrowers’ informational opacity
in business environments with weak information infrastructures if factors can develop proprietary
databases on account payment performance and if the underlying accounts are the obligations of
relatively transparent firms. The latter condition holds when a borrowing SME has receivables from
larger enterprises or has foreign receivables from firms in countries with a stronger information
infrastructure.
Occurring around the world, the global volume of factoring reached 760 billion euro in 2003, an
increase of 67 percent over 1998 (Table 1A). In some countries, such as the United States, factoring’s
importance as a primary source of working capital is concentrated in certain industries. But in other
countries, such as Italy, factoring’s importance as a primary source of working capital is far more
widespread. Both domestic and international factoring are becoming major sources of financing in
developing economies—including in Eastern Europe (EU 8 plus Romania), where factoring grew by
434 percent in aggregate between 1998 and 2003, with some individual countries displaying even
higher growth rates (Table 1B).
Like traditional commercial lending, factoring provides SMEs with working capital. But factoring
andasset-basedlending (another type ofasset-basedfinance) are bothquite different fromtraditional
commercial lending, where credit is primarily based on the borrower’s creditworthiness rather than
the value of the borrower’s underlying assets. In a traditional lending relationship in well-developed
financial markets, the lender looks to collateral only as a secondary source of repayment. The primary
source of repayment is the borrower and its viability as an ongoing concern.
In addition, in a traditional commercial loan the extension of credit—even when it is collateral-
ized by accounts receivable—is not explicitly linked to the value of the underlying assets (such as the
continuously updated value of accounts receivable). In contrast, under asset-based finance the under-
1 The other type of asset-based finance, known as asset-based lending, is practiced in only a few countries—mainly
the United States, and to a lesser extent Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. (In the United Kingdom asset-based
lending is known as invoice discounting.) Whereas under factoring the lender (factor) purchases accounts receivable
from the seller, under asset-based lending the lender secures the assets as collateral. Moreover, collateral is not limited
to accounts receivable: it can also include inventory and equipment. Thus, asset-based lending requires good secured
lending laws, electronic collateral registries, and quick and efficient judicial systems, which are often unavailable in
developing countries. Asset-based lending is discussed in greater detail later in this paper.
THE WORLD BANK 1What Is Factoring?
Annual Volume by Country (million euro) Table 1A.  Global Factoring




Austria 1832 2007 2275 2181 2275 2932 60.0%
Belgium 4366 7630 8000 9000 9391 11500 163.4%
Cyprus 959 1120 1410 1554 1997 2035 112.2%
Czech Republic 468 780 1005 1230 1681 1880 301.7%
Denmark 2894 3360 4050 5488 5200 5570 92.5%
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 213 470 615 1400 2143 2262 962.0%
Finland 5230 5630 7130 7445 9067 8810 68.5%
France 44255 53100 52450 67660 67398 73200 65.4%
Germany 20323 19984 23483 29373 30156 35082 72.6%
Greece 596 850 1500 2050 2694 3680 517.4%
Hungary 115 144 344 546 580 1142 893.0%
Iceland 21 100 125 26 16 25 19.0%
Ireland 3957 6160 6500 7813 8620 8850 123.7%
Italy 75319 88000 110000 124823 134804 132510 75.9%
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 197 257 ..
Netherlands 17702 20500 15900 17800 20120 17500 -1.1%
Norway 3787 4260 4960 5700 7030 7625 101.3%
Poland 609 605 2085 3330 2500 2580 323.6%
Portugal 5545 7450 8995 10189 11343 12181 119.7%
Romania 20 37 60 98 141 225 1025.0%
Russia 0 0 0 0 168 485 ..
Slovakia 179 160 160 240 240 384 114.5%
Slovenia 14 35 65 71 75 170 1114.3%
Spain 9936 12530 19500 23600 31567 37486 277.3%
Sweden 7677 7550 12310 5250 10229 10950 42.6%
Switzerland 1464 1300 1300 1430 2250 1514 3.4%
Turkey 4043 5250 6390 3947 4263 5330 31.8%
United Kingdom 84255 103200 123770 136080 156706 160770 90.8%
EUROPE TOTAL 295779 352212 414382 468324 522851 546935 84.9%
Argentina 1026 1481 1715 1017 71 70 -93.2%
Brazil 13620 17010 12012 11020 11030 12040 -11.6%
Canada 1863 1952 2256 2699 3100 3161 69.7%
Chile 1991 2600 2650 3123 3130 3500 75.8%
Costa Rica 162 226 258 208 210 185 14.2%
Cuba 0 185 108 113 120 93 ..
El Salvador 0 0 0 123 157 102 ..
Mexico 2519 3550 5030 6890 6340 4535 80.0%
Panama 0 11 220 220 0 160 ..
U.S.A. 70059 88069 102268 101744 91143 80696 15.2%
AMERICAS TOTAL 91240 115084 126517 127157 115301 104542 14.6%
Israel 108 219 460 429 354 190 75.9%
Lebanon 0 0 0 10 22 35 ..
Morocco 187 57 45 50 190 160 -14.4%
Oman 14 21 30 36 29 10 -28.6%
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 150 100 50 ..
South Africa 3957 5340 5550 5580 5860 5470 38.2%
Tunisia 54 73 60 171 153 210 288.9%
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0 37 ..
AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST TOTAL 4320 5710 6145 6426 6708 6162 42.6%
China 11 31 212 1234 2077 2640 23900.0%
Hong Kong 1294 1800 2400 2690 3029 3250 151. 2%
Indonesia 28 33 3 0 1 1 -96.4%
India 174 257 470 690 1290 1615 828.2%
Japan 38980 55347 58473 61566 50380 60550 55.3%
Malaysia 687 805 585 842 610 718 4.5%
Singapore 1510 1970 2100 2480 2600 2435 61.3%
South Korea 17149 15120 115 85 55 38 -99.8%
Sri Lanka 38 62 99 115 110 102 168.4%
Taiwan 1004 2090 3650 4511 7919 16000 1493.6%
Thailand 715 1010 1268 1240 1274 1425 99.3%
ASIA TOTAL 61590 78525 69375 75453 69345 88774 44.1%
Australia 3319 5100 7320 7910 9527 13716 313.3%
New Zealand 162 184 100 410 465 263 62.3%
AUSTRALASIA TOTAL 3481 5284 7420 8320 9992 13979 301.6%
WORLD TOTAL 456410 556815 623839 685680 724197 760392 66.6%
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Austria 2598 334 11.4% 1.2% 106.4 52.1
Belgium 9500 2000 17.4% 4.0% 76.3 82.3
Cyprus 2000 35 1.7% 20.7% 125.4 ..
Czech Republic 1600 280 14.9% 2.5% 33.4 65.2
Denmark 3570 2000 35.9% 3.2% 146.4 44.9
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 2012 250 11.1% 7.8% 21.8 58.2
Finland 8545 265 3.0% 7.2% 60.0 38.1
France 68200 5000 6.8% 4.9% 87.2 27.1
Germany 27131 7951 22.7% 1.6% 118.9 35.5
Greece 3500 180 4.9% 2.1% 67.1 20.5
Hungary 1080 62 5.4% 0.9% 35.3 64.5
Iceland 0 25 100.0% 0.2% 100.5 39.7
Ireland 8800 50 0.6% 7.4% 110.3 ..
Italy 124510 8000 6.0% 11.9% 82.3 26.9
Luxembourg 237 20 7.8% 1.0% 111.4 145.3
Netherlands 16000 1500 8.6% 5.0% 147.9 61.7
Norway 6800 825 10.8% 3.9% 86.3 41.5
Poland 2450 130 5.0% 1.4% 28.8 28.0
Portugal 11828 353 2.9% 9.8% 147.9 ..
Romania 90 135 60.0% 0.3% 8.3 35.4
Russia 470 15 3.1% 0.1% 17.6 34.7
Slovakia 296 88 22.9% 1.1% 40.6 72.8
Slovenia 140 30 17.6% 0.4% 39.2 57.9
Spain 36443 1043 2.8% 5.1% 111.1 28.5
Sweden 9650 1300 11.9% 4.5% .. 43.3
Switzerland 1298 216 14.3% 0.9% 159.0 44.2
Turkey 4200 1130 21.2% 2.4% 14.9 29.7
United Kingdom 158270 2500 1.6% 10.5% 142.6 25.8
EUROPE TOTAL 511218 35717 6.5% 5.4%
Argentina 65 5 7.1% 0.1% 15.3 27.7
Brazil 12000 40 0.3% 2.6% 35.5 15.8
Canada 2131 1030 32.6% 0.5% 82.2 ..
Chile 3300 200 5.7% 5.1% 68.1 35.9
Costa Rica 180 5 2.7% 1.3% 30.1 42.4
Cuba 30 63 67.7% .. .. ..
El Salvador 100 2 2.0% 1.2% .. 26.7
Mexico 4435 100 2.2% 1.0% 12.6 27.2
Panama 160 0 0.0% 0.0% 97.6 28.2
U.S.A. 77496 3200 4.0% 0.9% 140.6 9.8
AMERICAS TOTAL 99897 4645 4.4% 1.0%
Israel 20 170 89.5% 0.4% 97.8 37.2
Lebanon 35 0 0.0% 0.1% 90.8 13.9
Morocco 130 30 18.8% 0.6% 54.4 32.3
Oman 10 0 0.0% 0.1% 38.6 56.8
Saudi Arabia 50 0 0.0% 0.1% 58.2 40.8
South Africa 5350 120 2.2% 5.9% 131.7 34.0
Tunisia 160 50 23.8% 0.8% 68.6 44.8
United Arab Emirates 36 1 2.7% 0.0% 55.9 ..
AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST TOTAL 5791 371 6.0% 1.3%
China 2400 240 9.1% 0.2% 136.5 28.9
Hong Kong 2000 1250 38.5% 2.0% 150.1 150.8
Indonesia 1 0 0.0% 0.0% 22.3 35.4
India 1500 115 7.1% 0.3% 32.6 15.2
Japan 60000 550 0.9% 1.3% 175.3 11.1
Malaysia 690 28 3.9% 0.7% 146.1 114.1
Singapore 2060 375 15.4% 3.1% 115.5 ..
South Korea 0 38 100.0% 0.0% 115.6 40.0
Sri Lanka 94 8 7.8% 0.7% 28.5 36.2
Taiwan 11700 4300 26.9% 2.9% .. 53.8
Thailand 1400 25 1.8% 1.1% 102.5 64.7
ASIA TOTAL 81845 6929 7.8% 1.0%
Australia 13656 60 0.4% 2.4% .. 19.6
New Zealand 250 13 4.9% 0.8% 118.1 33.2
AUSTRALASIA TOTAL 13906 73 0.5% 2.2%
WORLD TOTAL 712657 47735 6.3% 2.5%
Source: Factors Chain International, World Bank.
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writing focus is the value of the underlying assets (that is, the accounts receivable, and the inventory
under asset-based lending in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States). The
borrower’s viability and creditworthiness, though not irrelevant, are only of secondary underwriting
importance.
Factoring can be done on a non-recourse or recourse basis. In well-developed financial markets
a lot of factoring occurs on a non- recourse basis, where the factor assumes title to the accounts as
well as all or most of the default risk, because the factor does not have a claim (recourse) against
its client (the borrower) if the accounts default. Under recourse factoring, on the other hand, the
factor has a claim against its borrower for any account payment deficiency. Thus losses occur only if
the underlying accounts default and the borrower cannot make up the deficiency.
In developed countries factoring is usually done on a non- recourse basis. In Italy, for example, 69
percent of factoring is done on a non-recourse basis (Muschella 2003). Similarly, a study of publicly
traded U.S. firms found that 73 percent factored their receivables on a non-recourse basis—but that
sellers (borrowers) with low-quality receivables were more likely to factor under recourse (Sopranzetti
1998).2 But in emerging markets, where it is often difficult to assess the default risk of underlying
accounts, most factoring is done on a recourse basis.3
In addition to the recourse/non-recourse dimension, factoring can be done on either a notification
or a non-notification basis. Notification means that the client’s customers are notified that their
accounts (that is, their payables) have been sold to a factor. Under notification factoring the client
typically furnishes the factor with delivery receipts, an assignment of the accounts, and duplicate
invoices that clearly indicate to the client’s customers the identity of the factor and the fact that their
accounts have been purchased by the factor.4
As noted, in a typical factoring relationship the factor provides a bundle of services: financing,
the credit risk assumption service, and the collection service. The credit services involve assessing the
creditworthiness of the client’s customers whose accounts the factor will purchase, based on the
invoices associated with each account. (This does not mean that the client cannot sell and extend
trade credit to a customer whose credit has been denied by the factor—but the client will not
receive funding for those invoices.) Factors typically base these assessments on a combination of their
proprietary data and publicly available data on account payment performance.
The collection services involve collecting current accounts and collecting delinquent accounts
and minimizing the losses associated with the latter. This means dunning delinquent accounts and
pursuing collections through the judicial system.5 Essentially, SMEs that use factors are outsourcing
their credit and collection functions— another important distinction between factors and traditional
commercial lenders.6
2 Sopranzetti’s results are consistent with the theoretical model he presents in his paper. This model allows for the
possibility that factors have better monitoring capacity than sellers—a view that appears quite consistent with the typical
way that factoring is conducted. His model is also based on the assumption that sellers and factors have equal ability
to observe account quality. This assumption may be difficult to reconcile with industry practice. It appears that in most
cases factors have better information about the quality of the underlying accounts because of the economies of scale
they enjoy in developing large databases on account payment performance (Udell forthcoming). As noted in the main
text, factoring may best be viewed as a bundle of services, one of which is outsourcing of the credit function.
3 One exception to the dominance of recourse factoring in Eastern Europe (and other emerging markets) appears
to be the case of factoring foreign receivables. As discussed later in the paper, most foreign receivables appear to be
factored on a non-recourse basis, though they typically also involve either a factoring alliance or credit insurance.
4 In general, factoring with recourse does not include notification, but factoring without recourse may. Because in
many countries there is a negative association with factoring, firms may be apprehensive to use factors that notify
customers.
5 Dunning refers to notification to the obligor by the obligee, or the obligee’s agent, that an account is delinquent
(that is, past due).
6 Factors, in turn, may outsource the collection of delinquent accounts to bad debt collectors.
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Box 1. The History of Factoring
Factoring is one of the oldest forms of commercial finance. Some scholars trace its origins to the Roman Empire
(Rutberg 1994)– -and some even further back to the Hammurabi, four thousand years ago (Papadimitriou, Phillips,
and Wray 1994). The term factor comes from the Latin verb facio, which means “he who does things.” As the Latin
verb suggests, the history of factoring is the history of agents doing things for others.
For example, factoring was a well-developed activity in England in the 14
th century, where it evolved with the
growth of the wool industry. The job of factors centered on their functions as sales agents, or commission merchants,
for textile mills. The distances between customers and manufacturers made commerce problematic—given the
primitive forms of transportation and communication—so factors assumed complementary functions to address the
business challenges that arose because of these distances.
At the center of these functions was the factors’ role as the sales force for the textile mills. As a byproduct of this
activity, factors assumed other marketing and distribution functions, including offering advice on customer tastes,
product demand, and warehousing services– -so that mills could ship merchandise to the factors, who would then
ship to the final customers.
Factors also assumed some critical financial functions on behalf of the mills. They offered credit advice on
how much to sell on account to potential customers. They also guaranteed payments to the mills, assuming full
responsibility for the creditworthiness of the mills’ customers. To protect themselves, factors established reserves to
cover claims for defective merchandise and any disputes that arose out of those claims. Finally, and equally important
from an historical perspective, factors advanced funding to the mills based on the value of the merchandise sold.
Thus, in essence, factoring was fully reflected economically in the financial component of the factoring business as it
existed 600 years ago.
The difference between today and 600 years ago is that the sales, or “agenting,” component has been purged
from the factoring relationship. But factoring as it is typically practiced in both developed and developing economies
can still be viewed as a bundle of activities. In addition to financing, factors typically provide their clients with two
other services: credit and collections.
A factor may enjoy several important advantages in offering credit and collection services. First,
it may reap significant economies of scale in both activities relative to its clients. Because the factor
performs these services for many different clients, it can amortize the fixed costs associated with
them. In addition, most small SMEs likely have little expertise in either area. Finally, factors generate
proprietary databases on account payment performance. The largest and more experienced factors
essentially become the equivalent of large credit information exchanges, offering an alternative to
private commercial credit bureaus and public credit registries. They also enjoy the same economies of
scale in information exchange that credit bureaus and public credit registries do (Kallberg and Udell
2003a).
Another feature of the factoring relationship is that a factor typically advances less than 100
percent of the face value of the receivable even though it takes ownership of the entire receivable.
The difference between this advance amount and the invoice amount (adjusted for any netting
effects such as sales rebates) creates a reserve held by the factor. This reserve will be used to cover
any deficiencies in the payment of the related invoice related to customer claims or allowances.7 If
and when the invoice is paid in full, the factor remits the reserve amount to the client.8 A typical
advance rate might be 70 percent (although this could be up to 90 percent), which establishes a 30
percent reserve.
Factors charge their clients a commission fee, and an additional interest charge (if the client
avails himself of the funding option). In the simplest arrangements this could all be subsumed in
a single commission. Thus, for example, if the factor purchases a $100 receivable from its client under
7 The availability of this reserve to cover deficiencies may vary. In the situation described above, the reserve is applied
only to the invoices of a specific account. Alternatively, the factoring contract could permit reserves against one account
to be applied to deficiencies in other accounts.
8 The reserve account represents a liability of the factor to its client. In effect, the client has extended contingent
credit to the factor, exposing the client to risk. If the factor becomes insolvent, the client will become a general creditor
of the factor and be exposed to a potential loss up to the amount of the reserve. Thus the factor’s reputation and
creditworthiness may be important considerations for the client.
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a factoring relationship that specifies a 70 percent advance and 2 percent commission, the factor
would advance $68 and acquire ownership of the receivables on the day the invoices are generated.
If the invoices are paid in 31 days, the factor remits $30 to the client on the 31st day (Figure 1).
Factoring usually involves additional fees beyond the commission. For example, interest may be
charged on the outstanding balance of receivables or on the balance of receivables outstanding more
than a fixed number of days.9 Alternatively, interest can be fixed and included in the commission.
Factoring may also include an application fee, credit checking fees, an origination fee, pre-contract
due diligence fees (to conduct onsite and offsite reviews of client books and records), and fees to
search public records for tax liens or judgments, lawsuits, bankruptcy filings, administrative actions,
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Ongoing Process: Credit Information
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Source: Worthy 2003





























The specific fees will be defined in the factoring agreement. This agreement will also cover a broad
range of other issues associated with the relationship between the factor and the client, including the
effective date of agreement, initial terms, renewal options, exclusivity of the factoring relationship,
invoices required to be factored, minimum factored volume requirement, maximum cash advances
availabletoclient,purchasepriceofinvoices,percentageofpurchasepricetowhichclientisentitledto
be paid in advance, minimum required reserve percentage or amount, and termination provisions.10
9 In some factoring relationships, known as maturity factoring, the factor advances funds only on invoices outstanding
more than a specified period, such as 30 days.
10 For more detail on the practice of factoring see Salinger (1999).
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FACTORING FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
This section assesses the importance of factoring in different countries, including the conditions
that determine that importance. The discussion begins with an analysis of where factoring fits in the
menu of lending products for SMEs. Next it considers the special case of factoring foreign receivables.
After that, the global factoring market is summarized. The section ends with a discussion of how
a country’s information infrastructure and legal environment affect the use of factoring relative to
other financing techniques.
LENDING PRODUCTS: WHERE FACTORING FITS
Private debt markets offer highly structured, complex contracts to informationally opaque SMEs.
Except for trade credit, most external financing to SMEs is extended by financial intermediaries
that produce information about small businesses to solve the problems that arise from information
asymmetries. The access to credit information and the technology in local lending environments
determine the extent to which SMEs obtain sufficient external financing to exploit profitable projects.
The extent to which the business environment inhibits the optimal provision of credit determines the
size of the funding gap that SMEs might face.
This section examines how factoring and the other lending products used in SME financing differ
in terms of the underwriting process and the contracts associated with each product, and how each
product addresses asymmetric information. This discussion will be helpful for the sections that follow,
and will help explain why factoring may be better suited for developing economies than some other
lending products.
From a policy perspective the importance of these various types of lending stems from the pos-
sibility that SMEs face significant funding gaps, which would occur if firms encountered significant
financial constraints due to systematic credit rationing.11 In a Modigliani and Miller world with
complete information transparency, there would be no financial constraints that would inhibit SME
growth. Therefore, the severity of the funding gap problem depends on the magnitude of informa-
tion problems in SME financing (i.e., deviations from information transparency) and the strength of
lending technologies to mitigate these problems.
Evidence suggests that the funding gap is a serious problem for SMEs. For example, insider
finance is extremely important in SME funding—suggesting an information-driven pecking order to
such financing (Berger and Udell 1998). Personal net worth and personal assets are important factors
in determining whether potential entrepreneurs decide to start businesses (Evans and Jovanovic 1989;
Evans and Leighton 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994; Lel and Udell 2002) and how they
initially invest in their firms (Ando 1985; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994).12 SME funding
gaps are also indicated by the fact that small firms’ cash flows affect their investment decisions
(Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988).
11 There is a long theoretical literature on equilibrium credit rationing based on asymmetric information, beginning
with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Around the world, governments invest billions of dollars a year in loan and equity
guarantee schemes, venture capital trusts, soft loan schemes, grants, equity investments, and other programs to address
the perceived funding gaps in their national economies. These initiatives are often partly motivated by the belief that
SME growth is critical to solving unemployment problems (e.g., Cressy 2002).
12 Although these findings are generally consistent with the presence of funding constraints, they may also be
consistent with other explanations. It may be that these results are driven by risk aversionrather thanfinancialconstraints.
There is even evidence that informational opacity may lead to excess SME funding (de Meza 2002).
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Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that this is not a Modigliani and Miller world is the fact that
financial markets are not indifferent about financial contracting. The contracts associated with SME
financing are not the same as the contracts associated with funding for larger firms. For example,
covenants tend to be more restrictive for smaller enterprises (Carey and others 1993) and for more
informationally opaque firms (Berlin and Mester 1993), loan maturities tend to be shorter for smaller
enterprises (Carey and others 1993), and collateral tends to be used more often for riskier borrowers
(Berger and Udell 1990, 1992; Carey, Post, and Sharpe 1998; Booth 1992; Klapper 1998).
Although it is useful to think about SME contracting in terms of these kinds of contract fea-
tures, this approach is incomplete— particularly for understanding how SMEs are financed across the
globe. Instead, recent analyses of SME financing emphasize that lenders use a variety of financing
“technologies” (that is, credit products) partly comprised of different combinations of these contract
features (Berger and Udell 2002). More fundamentally, however, these technologies can be differ-
entiated based on how they deploy contract features in underwriting and monitoring borrowers in
ways that address problems associated with informational opacity, the type of financing needed, and
the lending environment of the borrower. Although factoring has some advantages over the other
technologies, it also has disadvantages. But on balance, the advantages significantly outweigh the
disadvantages in developing economies.
This section assesses five lending technologies (including factoring) and two quasi-lending tech-
nologies used to mitigate the funding gap problem. All of these technologies address the challenge
of financing SMEs whose severe informational opacity makes financial contracting problematic be-
cause firm insiders (entrepreneurs) know much more about their firm’s quality than do outsiders. This
opacity leads to adverse selection when external finance is originated (that is, underwritten) because
weak firms mimic strong firms to obtain more favorable financing. It also leads to moral hazard after
funding, because entrepreneurs may exploit lenders by shifting from low- to high-risk strategies or
may engage in expense preference behavior.13
Financial statement lending
Financial statement lending involves underwriting loans based on a borrower’s financial statements.
There are two requirements. First, the borrower must have informative financial statements (such
as audited statements prepared by a reputable accounting firm according to widely accepted ac-
counting standards). Second, the financial ratios calculated from these statements must show that
the borrower has a strong financial condition. The loan contracts that arise from analyses of these
financial statements may reflect a variety of contracting elements, including collateral, personal guar-
antees, and covenants. But under financial statement lending the lender will view the company’s
performance as an ongoing concern (that is, its cash flow) as the primary source of repayment.
Financialstatementlendingaddressestheasymmetricinformationproblembygeneratinginforma-
tion about borrowers through informative financial statements. Interest rates, covenants, collateral,
and other contracting elements can be used in conjunction with this information to further ease the
13 There is also a private equity market that provides financing for a select group of SMEs—startup companies with
extremely high growth opportunities that often cannot get external debt financing because they lack tangible assets on
their balance sheets. In developed countries these enterprises are concentrated in the computer software, health care,
and biotechnology markets. Investments in these firms are driven by the prospect of eventually taking the firms public.
The investment side of this market is composed of individual investors called “angels” and venture capital firms. In the
United States the angel market is much smaller than the commercial loan market, supplying only 3.6 percent of SME
financing, while commercial lending supplies 23.6 percent and trade credit supplies 15.8 percent (Berger and Udell
1998). (Because of severe data limitations, the angel market estimate should be viewed with caution.) Venture capital
firms provide even less funding: 1.9 percent. Venture capital firms are much more developed in the United States than
in most other countries, though there was a notable increase in Western Europe in the late 1990s.
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risks of adverse selection and moral hazard. To successfully use financial statement lending, a financial
system must have well-defined accounting rules, and the borrower must have audited financial state-
ments. For small SMEs this latter condition is problematic—even in economies with strong accounting
standards—because of the cost of such statements.
Relationship lending
Relationship lending addresses the information deficiencies that make financial statement lending
problematic for some SMEs. The primary information used by lenders is “soft” information about the
relationship between the lender and the borrower (Rajan 1992). Over time lenders acquire proprietary
information about borrowers and their businesses from the provision of loans (Petersen and Rajan
1994; Berger and Udell 1995) and other products (Nakamura 1993; Cole 1998; Mester, Nakamura,
and Renault 1998; Degryse and van Cayseele 2000). This includes information on the local community
and business environment and the entrepreneur and the SME’s interaction with that environment. But
this type of labor-intensive lending can be quite costly—costs that are likely passed on to borrowers
in the form of higher fees.
Relationship lending is important in many countries, including Germany (Elsas and Krahnen 1998;
Harhoff and K¨ orting 1998), Italy (Conigliani, Ferri, and Generale 1997; Ferri and Messori 2000),
Japan (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein 1990), Spain (Jimenez and Saurina 2003), and the United
States (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell 1995). The strength of the lender-borrower
relationship often affects financial contracting on dimensions such as interest rates, collateral, de-
pendence on trade credit, and credit availability.
There is no hard evidence on the relative importance of relationship lending—or, for that matter,
financial statement lending. Unlike some other lending technologies, such as asset-based lending or
factoring, relationship lending and financial statement lending do not appear to be delivered out of
separate departments in lending organizations. But there is some indirect evidence. Several studies
indicate that large bankstend tomake loansbasedonhardinformation (such asfinancial statements),
while small banks tend to emphasize soft information (that is, relationship lending), suggesting that
relationship lending may be best delivered through smaller banks (Berger and others 2002; Berger
A. and I. Hassan, 2004; Cole, Goldberg, and White 2004; Scott 2004). These studies are consistent
with Stein (2002), which shows that the processing and communication of soft information may be
difficult for large banks.
Credit-scored lending
Credit scoring and similar quantitative techniques have been developed to evaluate credit risk. These
statistical models are used to quantify default probability or default risk classification and include the
linear probability model, logit models, and linear discriminant analysis (Saunders 1997).14 Widely
used in consumer lending for three decades, credit scoring has only recently been applied to SME
and micro-enterprise lending.15
The credit scoring models used in SME and micro-enterprise lending tend to be more complex
than those used in consumer lending and place considerable weight on factors associated with
the entrepreneur’s financial history (Feldman 1997). This follows from the fact that for the smallest
14 For a more detailed discussion of credit scoring models and newer quantitative techniques that can be used for
credit risk measurement and pricing, see Saunders (1999).
15 A type of credit scoring based on the original Altman Z-score model has been used for lending to medium-size and
large business enterprises since the 1970s (see Udell 1987). Even today, however, credit scoring does not appear to be
used as the primary underwriting criteria in these segments of the commercial loan market (see Udell 2004, ch. 5).
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SMEs, the creditworthiness of the owner is likely closely intertwined with the creditworthiness of the
business (Ang 1992; Mester 1997).16 But like consumer credit scoring, SME and micro-enterprise
credit scoring depends on a strong information infrastructure—particularly informative data from
credit bureaus. The adoption of SME and micro-enterprise credit scoring by lenders in countries with
weak information infrastructure may be problematic.
Asset-based lending
Lenders may be able to overcome information asymmetry by using asset-based lending, where the
borrower’sunderlyingassetsareofferedascollateralandconsideredtheprimarysourceofrepayment.
Whenprovidingworkingcapitalfinancing,bankslooktoshort-termassetssuchasaccountsreceivable
and inventory, and to equipment. The pledging of collateral does not, by itself, distinguish asset-based
lending from the three previous lending technologies. Collateralization with accounts receivable,
inventory, or equipment can be associated with financial statement lending, relationship lending,
and credit scoring. The difference is that with the other lending types, collateral (if it is used) is viewed
as a secondary source of repayment—whereas under asset-based lending, it is viewed as the primary
source of repayment.
The amount of credit extended under an asset-based loan is explicitly linked on a formula basis
to the liquidation value of the assets used as collateral. This link is continuously monitored to ensure
that the value of the assets always exceeds the amount of the loan. A key benefit of asset-based
lending is that an SME’s riskiness is not necessarily a barrier to finance if its underlying assets have
sufficient liquidation value. Thus, asset-based lending is well suited to high-risk SMEs.17
Another strength of asset-based lending is its ability to generate information about borrower
performance through the continuous monitoring of the underlying assets. This helps eliminate the
extreme form of risk shifting (moral hazard) that occurs when a firm’s insiders know that the company
is in distress before outsiders do (Udell forthcoming). Asset-based lending is an important source of
financing in the United States, where asset-based loans account for about one- third of total bank
commercial and industrial loans. But it is only significant in two other countries, Canada and the
United Kingdom. To be feasible, asset-based lending requires well-defined commercial law that clearly
specifies security interests, an efficient lien registration system that clearly defines when liens are filed,
and an efficient bankruptcy system that preserves lender priority (particularly security priority) and
minimizes time in bankruptcy.
Factoring
As discussed, factoring involves the purchase of accounts receivable by a lender known as a factor.
Though factoring is similar to asset-based lending, there are three important differences. First, factor-
ing involves only financing of accounts receivable, whereas asset-based lending also involves financing
of inventory and equipment. Second, under factoring the underlying asset, accounts receivable, is
sold to the lender (factor). Thus, title to them passes from the borrower to the lender—which means
that if the borrower becomes insolvent, the underlying asset (the factored accounts receivable) is not
part of the bankrupt’s estate. This distinction can be extremely important in financial systems with
ambiguous commercial law or inefficient bankruptcy systems (see below).
16 Lenders can purchase small business credit scoring models from vendors such as Fair Isaac.
17 There is relatively little empirical evidence on asset- based finance. Among the exceptions are recent studies that
find evidence consistent with practitioner and conventional wisdom that asset-based finance is associated with riskier
borrowers (Carey, Post, and Sharpe 1998; Klapper 2000). For a more detailed and institutional perspective on asset-based
lending, see Udell (forthcoming).
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Third, factoring is essentially a bundle of three services. The first is financing. Factors purchase
receivables on a formula basis in a manner similar to the accounts receivable component of an
asset-based loan relationship. The formula takes into account the creditworthiness of the underlying
accounts, dilution issues (for example, merchandise disputes, returned items), and the cost of col-
lections. As noted, factoring can be done on a recourse or non-recourse basis. Under the recourse
approach the factor has a contingent claim against the borrower for any deficiency in the collection of
the receivables. Under non-recourse factoring the factor assumes the risk associated with any loss in
the collection of the receivables. In non-recourse factoring the factor typically advances less than the
full face value of the receivables, and this “discount” is the difference between the advance and the
face value (e.g., 30 percent). A small portion of this discount is compensation for services rendered,
but the bulk of it is a reserve that can be used to offset merchandise disputes, returned items or other
customer claims or allowances.
The second service under factoring is the credit function. As noted, SMEs who use factoring are
essentially outsourcing their credit functions. The added value here is that factors enjoy significant
economies of scale when making credit decisions, reflecting their superior access to credit information
(including their own proprietary databases—“payment performance” being the most important). The
third service is collecting on delinquent accounts. Again, SMEs essentially outsource their collection
activities to factors,18 and factors enjoy significant economies of scale in this regard.
Trade credit
Trade credit is an important source of SME financing. Trade credit is credit extended by a firm’s
suppliers when the supplier sells the firm goods or services on account. Instead of paying for the
goods and services with cash (i.e., immediately), the firm pays its suppliers with a lag which creates
the equivalent of a loan (i.e., trade credit) from the suppliers to the firm. In the United States, for
example, trade credit accounts for 16 percent of SME financing (Berger and Udell 1998). Still, the
categorization of trade credit as a separate lending technology hinges on whether its underwriting
involves elements that distinguish it from the technologies already discussed.
Many of the previous technologies appear to be used in underwriting trade credit. For example,
credit scoring and similar quantitative techniques have long been part of the underwriting process
used by credit managers. For large accounts, financial statements are analyzed as part of the un-
derwriting process. And “soft” information and mutual trust developed over time undoubtedly play
a role in some trade credit, as in relationship lending.
The argument in favor of categorizing trade credit as a distinct lending technology is based on
the possible advantages that trade creditors have over other lenders. Researchers have suggested
comparative advantages in funding (Schwartz 1974), production and inventory management (Emery
1987), price discrimination (Meltzer 1960; Schwartz and Whitcomb 1979; Brennan, Maksimovic,
and Zechner 1988; Mian and Smith 1992; Petersen and Rajan 1997), and product quality guarantees
(Long, Malitz, and Ravid 1994). Some have suggested that trade creditors have an information
advantage over other lenders in evaluating their customers’ ability to pay (Emery 1984), solving
incentive problems (Biais and Gollier 1997), repossessing and liquidating goods in the event of
default (Mian and Smith 1992; Petersen and Rajan 1997), and withholding future supplies (Petersen
and Rajan 1997). For these reasons, it has also been suggested that trade credit technology has an
advantage over the other technologies in less developed countries (Cook 1999).
Finally, it has been argued that if product sellers (that is, trade creditors) have an information
advantage over other lenders (such as banks) and have an automatic collateral priority under local
18 However, in some cases the originator continues to be the collector.
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commercial law, then more trade credit will be used by less creditworthy companies (Frank and
Maksimovic 2003)19. This argument is consistent with the empirical findings of Chan and others
(2001). ( See Petersen and Rajan 1997 for a more complete summary of theories of trade credit.)
But there are reasons to suspect that these distinguishing features of trade credit may be limited.
For example, in countries with well-developed information exchanges (private commercial credit
bureaus or public credit registries), an established factoring industry, or a well-developed credit
insurance industry, it is not clear that trade creditors would have an advantage in terms of access to
credit information, given the economies of scale in information that these other institutions enjoy. In
fact, when trade creditors are SMEs, the opposite would seem to be true.
In addition, arguments based on trade creditors having an advantage in understanding their
customers’ business turn on whether the suppliers sell to industries closely related to their own and on
the extent to which they sell to a wide variety of industries (which would dilute their industry-specific
knowledge). Moreover, arguments based on trade creditors having a superior ability to repossess and
liquidate inventory may be problematic in countries where access to bankruptcy estates is limited (as
in the United States) or bankruptcy efficiency is weak (as in Italy).20
Finally, the existence of a significant credit insurance industry (see below) and the global perva-
siveness of factoring cast doubt on the superior information advantage enjoyed by trade creditors.
If this advantage existed, then vendors would not outsource their credit function to factors or credit
insurers. Given all these issues, and the lack of empirical cross-country analysis that addresses them,
it is not clear that trade credit is a separate lending technology.
Credit insurance
Credit insurance involves indemnifying accounts receivable against default. Financial institutions that
sell credit insurance to SMEs assume the risk associated with the possibility that some of the firms’
invoices may be uncollectible. Credit insurance does not involve credit extension and so cannot be
considered a lending technology. But it is closely related to factoring. Like factoring, credit insurance
involves the outsourcing of the credit functions. Like the factor, the credit insurer assumes the risk
associated with default (normally up to 80– 90%, versus factoring at 100%).
Credit insurance can be purchased by companies that sell to SMEs and by SMEs that sell to other
companies (SMEs or large enterprises). In some ways credit insurers compete directly with factors.
If a traditional lender (that is, a lender using financial statement or relationship technologies) buys
credit insurance on the receivables that it takes as collateral, this is essentially synthetic factoring.
Alternatively, an SME could purchase credit insurance on its receivables, enhancing the strength of
its balance sheet to make it eligible for a financial statement loan. Finally, a company that primarily
seeks to outsource the indemnification of credit risk, but not the financing function, might purchase
credit insurance instead of factoring.
Credit insurance is also used to complement factoring. Factors uncomfortable with their exposure
on some portion of receivables—say, when exposure on specific accounts or groups of accounts
becomes too large—may buy credit insurance to manage this risk. This would be an internal decision
19 The general applicability of the Frank and Maksimovic (2003) model might be somewhat limited. Many countries do
not give significant collateral priority to trade creditors. For instance, U.S. trade creditors generally do not have a collateral
interest in the products they have sold unless they file a purchase-money security interest. This is not common in most
trade relationships because the inventory has to be specifically identified (and identifiable) and filed with every invoice.
20 In addition, in some countries liquidation of assets such as inventory and equipment has become significantly
more efficient in the past decade. Large liquidators have substantial databases on asset values, and Internet liquidation
auctions appear to have changed liquidation from a local to a national market (Udell forthcoming). So, even if trade
creditors enjoyed an advantage in liquidation in the past, this advantage has diminished recently.
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of the factor and would typically not affect the factor’s client. Government-backed export credit
agencies also provide insurance for export factoring.
FACTORING FOREIGN RECEIVABLES
Factoring of foreign receivables involves additional issues centered on the fact that the account
obligors operate in different countries with different information infrastructures and different legal
and bankruptcy environments. One solution to this problem is a factor that operates in multiple
countries, as is the case with a few of the large factors that operate in Europe. This is not a feasible
option, however, for smaller or start-up factoring companies. For these factors, there are two other
solutions: export credit insurance and the two-factor system (“correspondent” factoring).
Credit insurance is a straightforward solution. A domestic factor simply purchases credit insurance
on the foreign receivables it buys from its local client. In effect, the domestic factor is outsourcing the
credit component of the factoring relationship on its foreign receivables while retaining the financing
and collection component. The domestic factor gains by retaining an account that it otherwise might
not be able to service. The credit insurer gains from the additional business. Thus, in this case credit
insurance and factoring are actually complementary activities (Charpentier 2003).
The other alternative is the two-factor system as promulgated by Factors Chain International (FCI).
Members of this organization use each other as “correspondent” factors. When a factor in Country
A, for instance, is asked to factor exports from Country A to Country B, the factoring company (in
Country A) will ask a correspondent factor in Country B to underwrite the credit risk on the importer
(in Country B) and to take over the collection task in order to expedite prompt payment by the
importer in accordance with the payment terms. The factor working closely with the exporter is
referred to as the Export Factor; while the factor in the country of the importer is referred to as the
Import Factor. FCI ensures that all its members work along standard rules and offers its members its
own communication system.
Using an Import Factor rather than a credit insurance companymay not necessarily be the cheapest
alternative for the Export Factor, but combining local expertise in the exporter’s country with local
expertise in the importer’s country often leads to superior service to the exporter. In particular, for
long-distance trade or for trade between countries with substantial commercial differences, the
two-factor solution is often the system of choice.
Not only does the exporter benefit from the two-factor system, but the Export Factor itself also
gains from the cooperation with foreign correspondents. By the nature of world trade, factorable
merchandise often flows from developing countries to highly developed markets. Export factoring is
normally the introductory and principal type of factoring in most developing and transition countries,
becauseinmanycasesitiseasierandsafertofactorexportreceivables,relativetodomesticreceivables,
as in export factoring the underlying receivables are usually located in countries with stronger legal,
information, and bankruptcy environments. Relatively inexperienced Export Factors gain in know-how
by working closely with foreign Import Factors, companies which have usually existed for many years
and have reached leadership in their respective markets. This transfer of know-how has assisted many
factors in developing markets to prepare themselves for successful entry into domestic factoring.
FACTORING IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT—AD ESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
This section considers factoring from a global perspective. The focus here is merely descriptive: how
does the impact of factoring differ by country? The next section builds on this analysis by examining
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potential reasons why the importance of factoring differs across countries. Data limitations prevent
a detailed, country-level analysis of the size of most of the lending technologies described above. For
example,therearenodatathatpermitananalysisoftheabsoluteorrelativesizeoffinancialstatement
lending compared with relationship lending. But factoring is an exception: data are available on the
volume of factoring at the country level.
Table 1A shows the volume of factoring by country and region from 1998–2003. The top three
countries in 2003 were the United Kingdom (160 billion euro), Italy (132 billion euro) and the United
States (86 billion euro). Growth in factoring was strongest in Australasia and Europe but evident in
all regions. Not surprisingly, growth in factoring was extraordinarily strong in Eastern Europe (EU 8
plus Romania)—growing by 434 percent in aggregate, though from a very small base. (The factoring
industry in the EU 8 is discussed in greater detail later in the paper.) Even more established factoring
markets in Western Europe, however, displayed unusually strong growth during the period under
review: 91 percent in the United Kingdom, 76 percent in Italy, and 73 percent in Germany.
Table 1B shows the volume of factoring as a percentage of GDP in 2002, allowing for comparisons
across countries about the importance of factoring to each economy. Factoring is much less important
to the financial system in the United States than it is in Cyprus, Italy, the United Kingdom and Portugal,
the four countries where factoring plays the largest role in the economy. In regional terms, factoring is
most important to the financial system in Europe. But, it is also quite important in countries elsewhere
in the world such as Chile, Singapore and South Africa.
In some countries a significant share of receivables is factored internationally, often through
factoring alliances. Thus, credit and collection of a receivable generated in international trade can be
factored effectively. In most countries the fraction of internationally factored receivables is quite small.
However, in some countries such as Israel and Hong Kong this fraction is quite large. The case of Hong
Kong (though not the case of Israel), which has a high ratio of exports to GDP, may suggest a positive
association between international factoring and higher export activity. Equally striking is the variance
of factoring’s importance. Even in Europe, where factoring is relatively important, there are big
differences in its importance across countries. Relative to credit to the private sector as a percentage
of GDP, it appears that countries with more developed factoring sectors have more developed credit
markets (Table 1B). But in some cases factoring seems to substitute for weak credit markets, as in
Italy, Portugal and the Baltics. In addition, factoring plays only a minor role in some large economies,
such as Canada and Germany (the latter for primarily legal reasons). Research on these associations
that controls in a multivariate regression analysis for other factors that might affect the volume of
factoring indicates that: (i) there is a positive relationship between a higher fraction of international
factoring and a larger percentage of exports; and (ii) there is a positive relationship between a higher
level of factoring (as percentage of GDP) and greater financial development (Klapper 2000).
FACTORING, THE GLOBAL CREDIT MARKET, AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS
Just as the importance of factoring varies significantly across countries, the relative importance of
other credit products varies widely as well. For instance, the fact that factoring plays a much larger
role in the Italian than in the U.S. economy likely implies that other types of lending play a much larger
role in the United States than in Italy. Although data limitations prevent a complete analysis of all the
lending technologies—particularly for financial statement lending and relationship lending—in the
case of Italy and the United States there is enough information to speculate that factoring substitutes
for asset-based lending. In Italy asset-based lending is nonexistent, while in the United States it is 25
times larger than factoring.
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The example of Italy and the United States suggests a more general pattern where lenders adopt
the lending products that work best in their credit environments. This implies that the importance of
factoring might vary across countries in a systematic way, in line with key aspects of the credit envi-
ronment. This section explores that possibility by examining some of the factors that drive differences
in the importance of factoring across countries.
Information infrastructure
A financial system’s information infrastructure may play a critical role in determining the level of
available credit, the mix of available lending products, and the importance of factoring in that
mix (Box 2). One key aspect of this infrastructure is information about payment performance. This
information may be critical because a firm’s record of paying its past obligations may be the best
indicator of its ability to pay its future ones.
Third party information exchanges are the most important source of such information. On the
consumer side of lending this means consumer credit bureaus. On the commercial side it means
public or private business credit bureaus. Credit bureaus address one of the main impediments to
credit availability: asymmetric information. If the information divide between borrowers and lenders
is too wide, credit rationing may result (Jaffee and Russell 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
Box 2. The Role of Reverse Factoring
In some developing countries with weak information infrastructure, factors use a different approach to offer their
services. In ordinary factoring the factor (lender) generally purchases many accounts receivable from a limited number
of sellers. But this approach requires the factor to collect credit information and calculate the credit risk for a large
number of customers. In the alternative, known as reverse factoring, the lender pools and purchases receivables
payable by only a few high-quality and/or international customers from many suppliers. Thus the lender only needs
to collect credit information and calculate the credit risk for a few large, transparent, internationally accredited firms.
Because the credit risk is lower, lenders in developing countries can absorb it and are better able to offer non-recourse
factoring.
For example, Heller Financial and Wal-Mart have a reverse factoring arrangement in Mexico. Wal-Mart offers
its Mexican suppliers the option of having their accounts automatically factored by Heller and receiving immediate
payment of 80 percent of the sale. (The additional 20 percent, less interest and service charges, is paid upon Heller’s
receipt of Wal-Mart’s payment.) Although the sellers may not have any relationship with Heller, they can receive short-
term financing because they are borrowing on Wal-Mart’s credit risk. By providing short-term financing, Wal-mart
is able to negotiate better terms with its suppliers and reduce its payment transaction costs (by paying one bill to
Heller rather than to a large number of suppliers). Furthermore, Heller can raise less costly financing by securitizing
its portfolio of Wal-Mart accounts receivable, which has a credit rating equal to that of Wal-Mart.
Source: Klapper and Vittas 2003
Participation by lenders in public credit bureaus, typically called credit registries, is often legally
mandated above a certain threshold. Most public credit registries are operated by the country’s
central bank or bank regulator. These government agencies typically require participation by regulated
financial institutions above a certain size (see Miller 2003, p. 37). In some countries, such as Belgium
and Italy, this threshold is very low for both consumers and businesses— meaning that participation
(and, thus, coverage) is very high.
Unlike public credit registries, private credit bureaus are voluntary. That is, lenders voluntarily
provide credit information to the credit bureaus. The inclusion of data on commercial bank loans
varies by country. For example, in the United States the three private credit bureaus (Equifax, Experian
and Trans Union) collect only consumer loan information, while in Argentina Equifax collects and
distributes both private business and consumer information and additional information, such as
ownership links among firms and credit scores.
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In addition, commercial information providers (sometimes called mercantile credit exchanges)
such as Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) provide credit reports that they generate typically from payment
performance information submitted by vendors. D&B is the world’s largest private business credit
registry, with a database of 64 million records, 13 million of which are in the United States.
The information produced by business credit bureaus can be quite valuable in making credit
decisions. In particular, failure prediction models that include mercantile credit information produced
by business credit bureaus have power in predicting firm failure beyond financial ratios and descriptive
information about the firm (Kallberg and Udell 2003b).21 Moreover, the existence of third party
information exchanges can affect credit availability and macroeconomic performance. A recent World
Bank survey indicates that without credit bureaus the time to process loans, the cost of making loans,
and the level of defaults would all be higher (Miller 2003). Another study found that countries with
more intense, established formal information sharing—either through credit registries or voluntary
information exchanges—exhibit greater bank lending relative to GNP (Jappelli and Pagano 2001).
That survey also found that credit risk is negatively correlated with measures of formal information
sharing.
Therehasnotbeenanyempirical analysisofthe impact of credit bureausonfactoring. Studies have
found a strong relationship between higher credit information sharing and more bank lending and
less credit rationing (Jappelli and Pagano 2001; Love and Mylenko 2003). And it seems likely that
credit bureau information would benefit all credit products. But the degree of its importance may
differ among lending technologies. For instance, credit bureau information is necessary for business
credit scoring. Consumer credit bureau information is particularly important here because in microen-
terprise lending where credit scoring has been applied, the creditworthiness of the entrepreneur—as
opposed to the business itself—tends to dominate (Cornett and Saunders 1999). In terms of rela-
tionship lending, credit bureau information may be crucial in the early stages of the bank- borrower
relationship, when the borrower’s reputation is still being formed.
But the importance of information exchanges to asset-based finance—asset-based lending and
factoring—is less clear. On the one hand, such lenders primarily base their credit decisions on the
value of a firm’s collateral, not the firm itself, so business credit information about their borrowers
may be of only secondary importance. On the other hand, business credit bureau information about
the obligors on their receivables could be quite valuable.
However, an offsetting effect might be that factors and asset- based lenders develop their own
databases on account payment performance (that is, on obligors’ accounts). This could make infor-
mation from business credit bureaus less valuable for institutions that offer asset-based finance—
particularly in countries where factoring is a dominant lending technology and factors are large.
Large factors in these countries may enjoy significant economies of scale because of the size of their
proprietary databases on account payment information. Indeed, some of these large factors may have
better databases than the business credit bureaus operating in their markets. This superiority could
come from wider database coverage or from higher reliability if private and public credit bureaus
suffer from relatively greater organizational inefficiencies (i.e., agency problems).
Table 2A contains information from a recent international study of public credit registries and
private credit bureaus. The second column indicates whether a country has a public credit bureau
(business or consumer) and the third whether a country has a private bureau (business or consumer).
A “1” indicates the presence of such an institution; a “0” indicates the absence. Most developed
countries have private credit bureaus—for example, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United
21 Fordetailedglobalanalysisofpublicandprivate credit bureaus, see Miller(2003). Fordetailedanalysisofinformation
collection by a private credit bureau, see Kallberg and Udell (2003a).
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States. Countries with the weakest information infrastructures are likely to have neither public nor
private credit bureaus (as in Oman). This suggests that in these countries factors would have to rely
substantially on their own databases for payment information on obligors’ accounts.
The quality of accounting information is another aspect of the information infrastructure. This
dimension is important because the strength of accounting standards determines the extent to
which lenders can accurately assess borrowers’ quality and condition. It is also important because
it substantially determines the efficacy of the use of covenants. Consequently, a country’s ability
to develop financial statement lending will likely be highly dependent on the quality of accounting
information. The first column of Table 2A presents data on the strength of accounting standards from
a study of 49 countries covering a variety of factors that affect financing (La Porta and others 1998).
Theindex usedtoassessaccountingstandardswasconstructedin1991bytheCenterfor International
Financial Analysis and Research. It measures the comprehensiveness of financial statements in seven
areas: general information, income statements, balance sheets, flow of funds statements, accounting
standards, stock data, and special items.
Table 2A shows wide variation in the strength of accounting standards. In general, more developed
economies have stronger standards. But even among these countries there are significant differences.
For example, Sweden has a score of 83, the United Kingdom 78 and Finland 77, while Austria is at
54 and Portugal 36. Some less developed countries score quite low, such as Argentina 45 and Chile
52. Financial statement lending is quite problematic in countries with poor accounting standards.
These countries might be able to offset this weakness if they have strong credit bureaus and strong
banking systems that can make relationship loans. Alternatively, factoring may be a viable alternative
because it does not depend on accounting information. As noted, Portugal has one of the world’s
most active factoring markets (relative to GDP). Egypt, on the other hand, does not even appear in
the Factors Chain International database—indicating that it may not have an economically significant
level of factoring.
Legal and judicial environment
A country’s legal and judicial environment may play a critical role in determining the mix of available
financing products and the importance of factoring in that mix. A key issue for factoring is whether
a financial system’s commercial law views factoring as a sale and purchase transaction rather than
as a loan. If it does, creditor rights and loan contract enforcement are less important for factoring
because factors are not creditors. That is, if a firm went bankrupt, its factored receivables would not
be part of its bankruptcy estate because they would be the property of the factor.
Still, creditor rights and contract enforcement are not irrelevant to factoring, for at least two
reasons. First, they define the environment in which the factor engages in collection activities. This
will affect underwriting standards because factors must take into account the anticipated cost and
efficiency of their collection activities when they make credit decisions about which invoices to
purchase. Second, under recourse factoring the factor has a contingent claim against the borrowing
firm if there is a deficiency in the collection of a receivable. This contingent claim can be secured or
unsecured depending on whether the factor filed a security interest in some or all of the firm’s assets
(as a secondary source of repayment).
The last four columns of Table 2B show four measures that proxy for the rule of law around the
world: the cost of contract enforcement, the rule of law, corruption, and political stability (Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003). Most developing countries suffer from weak enforcement. Although
a weak rule of law likely affects all lending products, it may affect factoring less because factoring
represents a property sale and purchase (as opposed to a secured loan). This exchange of property
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Table 2A. Comparative Business and Legal Environments
Information Infrastructure Strength of Public Credit Private Credit
Acc'tg Standards Registry Bureau
Bulgaria . 1 0
Czech Republic . 1 1
Baltic States . . .
Hungary . 0 1
Poland . 0 1
Romania . 1 0
Slovakia . 1 0
Slovenia . 1 0
EASTERN EUROPE . 0.7 0.4
Austria 54 1 1
Belgium 61 1 1
Cyprus . . .
Denmark 62 0 1
Finland 77 0 1
France 69 1 0
Germany 62 1 1
Greece 55 0 1
Iceland . . .
Ireland . 0 1
Italy 62 1 1
Netherlands 64 0 1
Norway 74 0 1
Portugal 36 1 1
Spain 64 1 1
Sweden 83 0 1
Switzerland 68 0 1
Turkey 51 1 1
United Kingdom 78 0 1
WESTERN EUROPE 63.8 0.5 0.9
Argentina 45 1 1
Brazil 54 1 1
Canada 74 0 1
Chile 52 1 1
Colombia . 0 1
Costa Rica . 1 1
Cuba . . .
El Salvador . 1 1
Mexico 60 0 1
Panama . 0 1
U.S.A. . 0 1
AMERICAS 57.0 0.5 1.0
Israel 64 0 1
Morocco . 1 0
Oman . 0 0
Saudi Arabia . 1 1
South Africa 70 0 1
Tunisia . 1 0
AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST 67.0 0.5 0.5
China . 1 0
Hong Kong 69 0 1
Indonesia . 1 0
India 57 0 1
Japan 65 0 1
Malaysia 76 1 1
Philippines . 0 1
Singapore 78 0 1
South Korea 62 0 1
Sri Lanka . 0 1
Taiwan 65 1 1
Thailand 64 0 1
ASIA 67.0 0.3 0.8
Australia 75 0 1
New Zealand 70 0 1
AUSTRALASIA 72.5 0.0 1.0
TOTAL WORLD 64.2 0.5 0.8
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Rights Enforcement Rule of Law Corruption
Political
Stability
Bulgaria 6,625 . 3 6.4 0.05 -0.17 0.56
Czech Republic 14,495 . 3 18.5 0.74 0.38 1.02
Baltic States 10,959 . . . 0.80 0.66 0.98
Hungary 12,656 . 2 5.4 0.90 0.60 1.08
Poland 10,021 . 2 11.2 0.65 0.39 0.71
Romania 6,024 . 0 13.1 -0.12 -0.34 0.42
Slovakia 11,781 . 2 13.3 0.40 0.28 1.01
Slovenia 17,137 . 3 3.6 1.09 0.89 1.21
EASTERN EUROPE 11,212 . 2.1 10.2 0.56 0.34 0.88
Austria 28,150 1 3 1.0 1.91 1.85 1.29
Belgium 26,412 1 2 9.1 1.45 1.57 0.97
Cyprus 17,725 . . . 0.83 0.89 0.36
Denmark 29,386 1 3 3.8 1.97 2.26 1.26
Finland 25,333 1 1 15.8 1.99 2.39 1.63
France 25,749 0 0 3.8 1.33 1.45 0.73
Germany 26,146 1 3 6.0 1.73 1.82 1.06
Greece 17,406 0 1 8.2 0.79 0.58 0.83
Iceland 29,715 . . . 2.00 2.19 1.55
Ireland 32,397 1 1 7.2 1.72 1.67 1.31
Italy 25,181 1 1 3.9 0.82 0.80 0.81
Netherlands 27,228 1 3 0.5 1.83 2.15 1.37
Norway 35,433 1 2 10.4 1.96 2.00 1.49
Portugal 17,595 1 1 4.9 1.30 1.33 1.43
Spain 20,279 1 2 10.7 1.15 1.46 0.82
Sweden 24,924 1 1 7.6 1.92 2.25 1.43
Switzerland 28,20 4 1 1 3.9 2.03 2.17 1.61
Turkey 5,790 1 2 5.4 0.00 -0.38 -0.61
United Kingdom 25,141 1 4 0.5 1.81 1.97 0.81
WESTERN EUROPE 24,642 0.9 1.8 6.0 1.50 1.60 1.06
Argentina 11,544 1 1 8.5 -0.73 -0.77 -0.74
Brazil 7,571 0 1 2.4 -0.30 -0.05 0.17
Canada 27,88 3 1 1 28.0 1.79 2.03 1.06
Chile 9,354 1 2 14.7 1.30 1.55 1.04
Colombia 6,050 . 0 5.9 -0.75 -0.47 -1.78
Costa Rica 8,543 . 1 22.6 0.67 0.88 1.06
Cuba . . . . -0.94 -0.13 0.22
El Salvador 4,614 . 3 7.3 -0.46 -0.54 0.35
Mexico 8,738 0 0 10.0 -0.22 -0.19 0.22
Panama 6,146 . 4 20.0 0.00 -0.24 0.36
U.S.A. 34,322 . 1 0.4 1.70 1.77 0.34
AMERICAS 12,477 0.6 1.4 12.0 0.19 0.35 0.21
Israel . 1 3 34.1 0.97 1.08 -1.35
Morocco 3,628 . 1 9.1 0.11 -0.04 -0.14
Oman 13,247 . 0 4.8 0.83 1.03 0.98
Saudi Arabia 11,516 . 2 . 0.44 0.57 0.05
South Africa 9,916 1 3 16.7 0.19 0.36 -0.09
Tunisia 6,501 . 0 4.1 0.27 0.35 0.24
AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST 8,962 1.0 1.5 13.8 0.47 0.56 -0.05
China 4,135 . 2 32.0 -0.22 -0.41 0.22
Hong Kong 25,393 1 4 6.9 1.30 1.52 1.03
Indonesia 3,020 . 2 269.0 -0.80 -1.16 -1.37
India 2,493 1 3 95.0 0.07 -0.25 -0.84
Japan 25,672 1 2 6.4 1.41 1.20 1.20
Malaysia 8,725 1 2 19.4 0.58 0.38 0.51
Philippines 3,919 . 1 103.7 -0.50 -0.52 -0.49
Singapore 22,456 1 3 14.4 1.75 2.30 1.28
South Korea 15,5 28 1 3 4.5 0.88 0.33 0.49
Sri Lanka 3,234 0 2 7.6 0.23 -0.14 -0.90
Taiwan . 1 1 0.5 0.95 0.81 0.71
Thailand 6,452 1 3 29.6 0.30 -0.15 0.55
ASIA 11,002 0.9 2.3 49.1 0.5 0.3 0.2
Australia 26,864 1 3 8.0 1.85 1.91 1.18
New Zealand 20,204 0 4 11.6 1.91 2.28 1.35
AUSTRALASIA 23,534 0.5 3.5 9.8 1.88 2.10 1.27
TOTAL WORLD 16,283 0.8 1.9 18.3 0.82 0.83 0.59
Source:  Doing Business 2003
Cost of contract
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rights should minimize the threat of competing interests from other creditors. Still, a weak rule of
law will make a factor’s collection activities more costly and less efficient. It will also decrease the
value of the factor’s recourse against its customers when it engages in recourse factoring and when
it takes a security interest in its customer’s assets as a secondary source of repayment.
As noted, factoring is the world’s dominant form of asset-based finance, and there are no sig-
nificant amounts of asset-based lending except in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Although it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from the data, these four coun-
tries score extremely high on the rule of law measures—while many countries where factoring is
widespread (such as Greece and Italy) score much lower. On the other hand, there are countries with
a strong rule of law that have significant amounts of factoring, the most notable of which is the
United Kingdom. Other examples include Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands. This suggests that
variables other than a weak rule of law may be important in driving factoring. One may be how well
commercial law works; another may be how security interests are treated in commercial law.
A financial system’s commercial law and the level of its enforcement help determine the environ-
ment in which financial contracting occurs. Commercial law specifies the property rights associated
with a commercial transaction, and enforcement of these rights determines the confidence of con-
tracting parties in financial contracts. Together these two features constitute the rule of law. At one
extreme are countries where commercial law is unambiguous and conducive to commercial transac-
tions and where enforcement is predictable. At the other extreme are countries where commercial law
is ambiguous and incomplete, enforcement is problematic, and criminal and racketeering behavior
block the creation of new businesses, undermine existing ones, and deter foreign investment (EBRD
Transition Report 2003a, p. 24).
In terms of security interests—that is, collateral liens—a country’s commercial law should clearly
define how a collateral lien can be perfected, how collateral priority is determined, and how no-
tification of a lien is made. Rules on security interests likely affect the efficacy of all non-factoring
lending technologies because collateral can be used in conjunction with each of them. But even in
a factoring relationship, a factor may take a collateral interest in the non-receivables of a client firm
as a secondary source of repayment.
Still, a country’s commercial law on security interests likely has the biggest impact on asset-based
lending, because collateral is the primary source of repayment under such lending. Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and the United States have well-defined and strongly enforced laws on security
interests, which partly explains why asset-based lending exists in these countries but not elsewhere.
Such laws give asset-based lenders confidence that they will have the right to liquidate their collateral
or receive comparable value in case of bankruptcy.22 (See Udell forthcoming for a detailed discussion
of U.S. law and Clark 1999 for a discussion of Canadian law.)
The third column of Table 2B presents data on the strength of creditor rights, from La Porta and
others (1998). This composite index ranges from 0 to 4, with 4 reflecting the strongest rights. The
indexisconstructedbyaddinga“1”foreveryoneofthefollowingconditions:ifsecuredcreditorshave
priority over others, if there are restrictions on management’s right to file for reorganization, if there
is no automatic stay, and if management is forced out in bankruptcy. An automatic stay involves
22 Therehasbeenanattempttoencouragetheadoptionofastandardsetoflawsonsecurity interestsonaglobalbasis.
In December 2001 the United Nations, under its United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
initiative, approved a template for security interests in accounts receivable. It is also working on a template for security
interests in other assets. The main goal of these initiatives is to promote cross-border lending. Arguably, an important
byproduct of global adoption of these templates would be an improvement in creditor rights worldwide. At this stage,
however, it is not clear whether a meaningful number of countries will adopt these templates.
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imposition of an immediate restriction on all creditors from taking action to collect their debt,
including repossession of collateral.23
Although these collateral-related contracting features may be more important to asset-based
lending and financial statement lending, collateral is also useful in the early stages of relationship
lending (Berger and Udell 1995). But it becomes less important as relationships between banks and
borrowers strengthen. Finally, factoring should be least affected by weak creditor rights—suggesting
that, other things being equal, factoring should play a bigger role in countries with weaker creditor
rights.
Tax and regulatory environment
A country’s tax structure can also affect the size of the factoring industry. Stamp duties on factored
invoices and other levies on factoring can impede the growth of the industry. Value added taxes
(VATs) may also have an effect, depending on the structure of the tax system. For example, although
the services fee associated with factoring should typically be subject to VAT, the financing should be
exempt to ensure a level playing field between factors and other lenders. Similarly, factors should
ideally enjoy the same tax treatment of provisioning for bad receivables as other lenders (e.g., banks)
but often they don’t as they are not recognized as formal financial institutions, particularly if they
are totally outside the scope of formal regulation (see below). Factoring of foreign receivables can
be problematic if foreign currency exchange laws present obstacles. For example, while in Sri Lanka
local factors, notwithstanding restrictive foreign exchange regulations, can offer export factoring by
negotiation slightly different procedures with foreign correspondent factors, they cannot engage in
import factoring.
The regulatory environment also has an important effect on the factoring industry. At one extreme,
factoring operates entirely outside the purview of any regulatory structure or authority. At the other
extreme factoring, is regulated along with other financial services such as banking and insurance. In
most countries the level of regulation falls somewhere in between.
Bank regulation of the factoring industry may have implications not only for the industry’s perfor-
mance but also for aggregate macroeconomic performance. Trade financing tends to be countercycli-
cal, and becomes more important when firms are in distress (Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel
1995; Chan and others 2001). Yet commercial bank regulation tends to be procyclical, because bank
regulators tend to scrutinize bank loans more carefully when an economic downturn begins. This
is consistent with other evidence that prudential regulation of commercial banks can cause a credit
crunch (Peek and Rosengren 1995).
Independent finance companies may play an important role in assisting the countercyclical be-
havior of trade credit by providing financing for receivables (Udell forthcoming). But the ability of
finance companies to perform this function may depend on the share of the industry that is inde-
pendent of bank regulation. To the extent that some factoring has moved from outside to inside
the bank industry—as in the United States—finance companies may be less able to perform this
23 Caution should be exercised in interpreting these findings. For example, the United States has a score of 1, for giving
secured creditors priority. It gets a zero for having an automatic stay and for removing management in bankruptcy.
Although the United States has an automatic stay, secured creditors can ask a court for relief from the stay if they can
show that it does not provide them with “adequate protection” and that it jeopardizes their interest in the property
of the debtor. Asset-based lenders routinely successfully petition for waivers of the automatic stay with respect to
their collateral. Moreover, if a court limits the ability of a secured creditor to liquidate its collateral, it is obligated to
give it “comparable value” in lieu of the proceeds from liquidation. In terms of removing management in bankruptcy,
management is not automatically removed, but neither is it automatically entitled to stay in place. Thus the United States
is arguably closer to a 3 than to a 1 on the overall index of creditor rights. If having well-defined commercial laws and an
efficient registration system were factored in, the United States would likely rank at or near the top along with Canada.
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role.24 Concern has been expressed that new international banking rules on bank capital (Basel II)
may exacerbate this problem, but it is too early to assess their impact.
THE ROLE OF FACTORING IN THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES
The previous sections laid the groundwork for this paper’s main focus: the current and future role
of factoring in Eastern Europe, particularly in the eight countries that became EU members on May
1, 2004: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and
Slovenia, referred to here as the EU 8. As discussed, factoring is one of the main lending technologies
used in SME financing. Relative to other lending products—financial statement lending, relationship
lending, asset-based lending, credit- scored lending, and trade credit—it has both strengths and
weaknesses. For example, it is more costly than financial statement lending and it does not provide
inventory financing like asset-based lending. But its advantages suggest that factoring should play an
important role in developing economies such as those in the EU 8.
Several characteristics of factoring may give it an edge in the EU 8. First, the fact that factoring
removes receivables from the borrower’s estate in bankruptcy may be useful if a country’s judicial
system is primitive, inefficient, or both—conditions that apply to certain EU 8 countries, as indicated
by World Bank Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) for insolvency and creditor
rights.25
Second, as a type of asset-based financing, factoring has a distinct advantage in providing funding
to high-risk SMEs. It is important that risky SMEs be able to develop in transition economies, as the
private sector in these countries develops and works to catch up to systems and mechanisms in
Western Europe.
Third, as an asset-based technology, factoring may have an advantage over other credit products
in lending to informationally opaque borrowers. Factors can base their lending decisions primarily on
the condition of SMEs’ underlying accounts rather than on their creditworthiness. This is likely to be
particularly important in the EU 8, where business activity may be skewed toward SMEs that by nature
are more informationally opaque than larger businesses. Two characteristics of a weak information
infrastructure—weak accounting standards and a shortage of audited financial statements—are
common in most EU 8 business environments.26
But another aspect of a weak information infrastructure would be problematic for factors. Limited
data on payment performance—such as that collected by public credit registries, private business
credit bureaus, credit insurance companies, or by factors themselves—would be problematic for
factoring domestic receivables. It would be much less problematic for factoring foreign receivables,
where the account obligors are in industrial countries with stronger information infrastructure.
Fourth, and closely related, factoring may be extremely useful in the early years of development of
SMEs that export to more developed economies. Large factors that operate in an importer’s country
24 Independent finance companies may also be vulnerable to procyclical prudential supervision if they are small and
depend on banks for funding. Larger independents and captives of large industrial groups may be much more insulated
because they have access to capital markets such as the eurobond market.
25 For selected country insolvency and creditor rights ROSC reports see http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc.html.
26 While going forward the EU 8, as new EU member states, must comply with the requirements of the EU Acquis
Communautaire in the accounting & auditing area, which should result in significant improvements in this respect, these
requirements (e.g., the use of IFRS) apply primarily to listed companies rather than to SMEs and also will take time to
translate into improved accounting and auditing practices and enforcement capacity.
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will likely already have generated information about the importer’s payment record. In addition,
domestic factors in the EU 8 have always factored foreign receivables by participating in alliances
such as Factors Chain International or, more recently, by buying credit insurance. Indeed, it may
be easier for factors in the EU 8 to develop their business around foreign rather than domestic
receivables.
This section first considers the extent to which these advantages have been exploited in the
EU 8. It then examines the characteristics of these countries that have shaped the development
of their factoring industries, based primarily on a World Bank survey of factors operating in them.
The section concludes with some predictions about how the factoring industry may develop in the
region, and suggests policy initiatives that may facilitate its growth and improve credit availability
more generally.
FACTORING MARKETS IN THE EU 8
To the extent that banks are able to provide financial statement lending, relationship lending, and
credit-scored lending, the need for factoring is probably less. Figure 2 shows bank credit to the
private sector (as a share of GDP) in the EU 8 and in the 15 countries that made up the European
Union before entry of the new members (referred to as the EU 15). Considerably more bank credit
is available in the EU 15—suggesting a significant funding gap in the EU 8 and the potential for
factoring to fill it.
















Figure 3 takes a more detailed look at the EU 8, breaking down sources of domestic financing
for the private sector. Although equity markets play a significant role, it is clear that the EU 8 have
banking- oriented financial systems. Intermediated finance dominates capital market financing even
for large firms. Thus, given that bank credit is insufficient in the EU 8, factoring could provide an
important source of financing even for large enterprises.
In recent years the factoring industry has grown significantly in most EU 8 countries, both in
absolute terms (Figure 4) and as a percentage of GDP (Figure 5). Poland has the largest volume,
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Figure 3.  EU 8 Sources of Domestic Credit
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followed by the Czech Republic and Estonia. Relative to GDP, however, Estonia is far ahead, followed
by Latvia and Lithuania. The very high level of development observed in Estonia, however, may at
least be partially explained by the unusual factoring of construction receivables (which are typically
not considered to be factorable, and hence excluded from factoring statistics), which may overstates
actual factoring penetration. The Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Hungary are next, and
are grouped relatively closely. Factoring penetration is considerably lower in Slovenia. The penetration
of factoring is considerably lower in the EU 8 than in Western Europe, though in the latter there also
is considerable variation (Figure 6). For example, factoring is much lower in Germany than in the rest
of the EU 15.
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The significant growth in factoring in most of the EU 8 suggests that factors in these countries have
been able to generate databases on domestic accounts, rely on external sources of such information
(such as business credit bureaus and credit insurers), or target exporters and finance their cross-border
receivables. Moreover, if the EU 15 can be used as a benchmark, there is considerable room for further
growth.
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FACTORING ENVIRONMENTS IN THE EU 8: SURVEY RESULTS
To better assess the factoring environment in the EU 8, the World Bank conducted a survey of factors
doing business in these countries. There were 13 respondents (all privately owned and operated
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factoring companies), with at least 1 in each country. All but 2 of the respondents were bank
subsidiaries. Most received their funding in the form of bank loans (presumably from their bank
affiliates or parents, although no information was collected on this issue).
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in the EU 8. In only one country (Lithuania) is VAT applied to interest payments on pre-financing
(Table 3). In four countries no VATs are applied to service fees for receivables administration and
collection services, while in four they are applied (with the tax rate in all four around 18 percent).
Perhaps more important, factors in all of the EU 8 countries indicated an absence of stamp duties
and other duties on document transfers applied to factoring. In some countries stamp taxes have
been a major constraint to the development of factoring. Only one country (Poland) indicated that
losses incurred on bad receivables are not recognized for tax purposes. Ex ante provisioning by factors
(as opposed to ex-post recognition of actual losses incurred) for problematic receivables is typically
not allowed in the EU 8. As most of the factors that responded to the survey are owned by banks,
however, the differential tax treatment in this respect (with banks allowed to deduct provisions) was
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not identified as a major issue. So, on balance the tax environment in the EU 8 appears favorable to
factoring.
The survey also asked whether EU 8 countries had a factoring act or a reference in the law (civil
or commercial code) legally recognizing factoring as a financial service. Such recognition clarifies
the nature of the transaction—for example, explicit recognition in the law of factoring dictates how
judges must rule toward factors in cases of default by sellers or customers. Recognition also tends to
legitimize the factoring industry. Only half of the EU 8 have such explicit legal provisions. Factoring
volumes (as a percentage of GDP) are higher in countries with explicit legal recognition of factoring,
although the development of such provisions may partly be in response to the development of, and
pressures from, domestic factors.
Several survey questions addressed regulation of factoring. Respondents from four of the EU
8 indicated that they were not subject to regulation. All the respondents in these countries were
bank subsidiaries. In three other countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) the central bank regulates
the factoring activities of respondents (all of whom were banks or bank subsidiaries). In Hungary
the respondent, who is not affiliated with a bank, is regulated by the Hungarian Financial Supervi-
sory Authority. Respondents from these four countries indicated that regulations include reporting
requirements.
Respondents were asked several questions about other lending technologies, including whether
banks extend collateralized loans against receivables under funding formulas explicitly linked to the
level of receivables. (These could be interpreted as being similar to asset-based loans if the links are
updated daily; otherwise these could be financial statement or relationship loans where collateral
serves as a secondary source of repayment.) Most respondents indicated the presence of such loans.
But most also indicated that the commercial laws governing security interests—which assure lenders
that their collateral liens can be perfected and that their priority will be upheld in bankruptcy—were
weak and difficult to enforce. Moreover, most indicated that their countries did not have a recording
systemforclearlyregisteringliens.Theseweaknessesinlegalsystemslikelygivefactoringanadvantage
over secured lending, so long as bankruptcy courts recognize factoring as a sale and purchase (that
is, recognize that factored receivables are not part of bankruptcy estates).
Survey respondents were also asked what proportion of their domestic-factored and foreign-
factored receivables were factored with recourse. On average, 66 percent of domestic receivables are
factored with recourse, while only 35 percent of foreign receivables are factored with recourse. This
result is consistent with the finding of Sopranzetti (1998), discussed earlier, that recourse is more
likely if sellers’ receivables are of lower quality (assuming that the foreign receivables of respondents’
customers are of higher quality than their domestic receivables).
The survey asked respondents about their primary sources of information for their customers
(borrowers) and their underlying account obligors. For customers, six of the thirteen respondents
said that the information came from credit bureaus or other information providers (typically Dun and
Bradstreet or domestic bank supervisors). Five said that they used information from their proprietary
databases. Because of the large extent of recourse factoring, the creditworthiness of borrowers (the
sellers of receivables) is more important in the EU 8 then in more developed economies.
Perhaps more interesting are the findings about the underlying account obligors. Only four of the
respondents said that they relied, in whole or in part, on their proprietary databases—suggesting that
factors in the EU 8 have not built up their databases to the point where they are superior to other
sources, though there is potential for this source of information to improve as the industry develops.
Eight of the respondents said that they relied, in whole or in part, on business credit bureaus, and
two relied, in whole or in part, on credit insurers. Thus, third party information exchanges may be
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more important in producing information about payment performance than the factors, as found by
Jappelli and Pagano (2001).
LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS IN THE EU 8
This section examines EU 8 legal environments—and their effects on factoring—from various perspec-
tives, assessing the strength of the rule of law, commercial law, contract enforcement, and bankruptcy
proceedings.
Rule of law
The strength of a country’s rule of law affects the level of mutual trust in transactions among state
institutions, ordinary citizens, and firms (EBRD Transition Report 2003a). Arrow (1972, 1974) calls
trust an “important lubricant” in commercial transactions, and it has been shown empirically that the
level of trust influences the terms on which banks lend to SMEs (Harhoff and Korting 1998).
Figure 7. Rule of law and progress in transition
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Sources: EBRD and World Bank.
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In Eastern Europe there is a positive association between the rule of law and structural and
institutional reform. That is, the countries with the strongest rule of law have generally made the most
progress in transition (Figure 7). Such countries also have the highest levels of trust (as measured by
vendors’ demands for prepayments) and lowest levels of corruption (as measured by the World Bank’s
“control of corruption” variable and Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index).
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Commercial law
In recent years there has been considerable analysis of commercial law on security interests in Eastern
Europe, particularly in the EU 8. For example, in 2003 the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) launched the New Legal Indicator Survey, which focuses on secured transactions.
The survey, prepared by EBRD legal experts, assesses the extent to which country laws comply with
international standards. These assessments are supported by case studies that evaluate the extent to
which legal systems provide efficient outcomes.
The survey found that transition economies have made considerable progress in bringing their
commercial laws on secured transactions up to international standards. But progress has been slow
in some areas, such as in the scope of assets that can be secured, in public notification, and in
enforcement and priority. Although in principle most countries allow security to be granted over
most types of movable property (such as accounts receivable and inventory), restrictions often exist in
the general law—particularly in the need for specific descriptions of each asset included as collateral.
Such restrictions preclude the use of many modern financing techniques that involve granting security
over groups or pools of assets. Among the EU 8, only Hungary and the Slovak Republic do not have
problems in this area (EBRD Transition Report 2003a).
A registration, or notification, system is critical. Creditors must be alerted immediately when
another creditor files a lien against assets. In addition, the system must unambiguously sequence
these claims so that a secured lender can have confidence that its lien will be registered as having
priority. Clear rules must be established about where claims must be filed. (This can be problematic for
borrowers with multiple locations.) Though much progress has been made, EBRD Transition Report
2003a) finds that registration systems have weaknesses in most countries in the region. (See the
annex for detailed descriptions of EU 8 systems for registration and secured transactions.)
Among the EU 8, Hungary, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic have undertaken the most extensive
reforms in adopting legal and institutional frameworks for secured transactions, although in Lithuania
financing instruments still suffer from deficiencies in formal requirements for defining collateral. The
Czech Republic, Latvia, and Poland have made substantial progress in this area, having conducted
major overhauls of their commercial laws on secured transactions. But in many cases there are still
significant shortcomings. In Poland, for example, the time required for registration is problematic, and
it takes an average of 1,000 days to enforce a contract (see http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness).
Finally, Estonia and Slovenia have made only minor reforms with respect to secured transactions.
Slovenia appears to be the least reformed of the EU 8, though it is introducing new provisions
for collateral. But the taking of security is limited, and there is no public register to allow tracking
of priorities and to alert third parties of existing charges. Box 3 provides more detailed analysis of
commercial laws and their effects on factoring in the EU 8.
Contract enforcement
Nomatterhowstrongacountry’scommerciallaw,lienregistration,andbankruptcylaw,theywillhave
a limited impact on credit availability if they are not enforced in a timely, predictable and uniform
fashion. Progress on this front is mixed in the EU 8. Compounding this problem is the fact that
assessments of this progress vary, with the EBRD reporting more favorable developments than the
World Bank. Still, both institutions agree that the EU 8 have made more progress on passing laws
consistent with international standards than on consistently applying them.
In 2003 the EBRD surveyed lawyers in transition economies to determine how well the law works in
practice. Lawyers were presented with a hypothetical scenario regarding the enforcement of a security
interest over movable tangible assets. The specific assets used as collateral were equipment and an
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Box 3. Legal Frameworks for Factoring in the EU 8
Czech Republic and Slovak Republic
The civil codes of the Czech and Slovak republics contain similar provisions on the assignment of receivables.
Receivables may be transferred, pursuant to a contract of assignment (as defined by the civil code), to a special
purpose vehicle. The vehicle need not be a particular form of business entity and does not require authorization to
purchase receivables. The validity of any assignment depends on its notification to the underlying debtor. There is
no legally prescribed system for making the assignment valid against third parties through a public register. Thus
a third party could seek to ignore the assignment in such circumstances. Czechoslovakia signed the Convention on
International Factoring, sponsored by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), in
1990.
Estonia
Estonia’s Credit Institutions Act enables credit and financial institutions to offer a wide array of financial services,
including lending, leasing, and money market instruments. Moreover, institutions can provide services other than
those specified as long as they are directly ancillary or supplementary to their principal activity, and they may found
or acquire an ancillary undertaking order to provide such services. Although the act does not explicitly use the term
factoring, it is sufficiently universal to encompass factoring among the financial services listed. Companies that engage
in leasing and factoring are often subsidiaries of credit institutions. In addition, a number of financial leasing firms
offer factoring services. Factoring transactions may be with or without recourse. Under recourse the factor is entitled
to resell the claims to the seller in full or in part. General rules for claims valuation also apply to factoring claims.
Hungary
Onlyfinancialinstitutionscanpurchasereceivables,subjecttotheauthorizationoftheHungarianFinancialSupervisory
Agency. Receivables are transferred to a special purpose vehicle by way of an assignment (as defined by the civil code).
The UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring entered into force in Hungary in 1996.
Latvia
Latvia’sLawonBanksallowsbankstoperformleasingandfactoringoperations.Inaddition,theUNIDROITConvention
on International Factoring entered into force in Latvia in 1998.
Lithuania
In 1999, to widen the range of banking operations, the Bank of Lithuania approved additional operations for
commercial banks— namely, factoring, financial intermediation, and cash management. In addition, in 2001 a new
civil code harmonized with international law the treatment of many aspects of various contracts, including for
factoring.
Poland
The 1997 Banking Act lists activities that banks can engage in, laying the ground for banks to offer factoring services.
But the activities listed were not restricted to banks, so other institutions can provide factoring as well.
Slovenia
The 1999 Banking Law says that banks can provide factoring services, defined as the “assumption of claims through
installment payments, with or without recourse.” Credits and guarantees between residents and non-residents are
regulated by the Foreign Exchange Act. The law differentiates between commercial and financial credits, classifying
factoring agreements as commercial credits as long as the underlying contracts are also commercial credits.
Source: World Bank
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inventory of finished goods. Respondents were then asked how the security rights of the hypothetical
client bank would be enforced in their country. Key findings from the survey include data on how
much a secured creditor can expect to recover (the amount), how quickly, and how simply.
The survey provides a surprisingly positive picture of enforcement, indicating that in all but one
EU 8 country (Poland) it is possible to recover at least 80 percent of the market value of the assets
taken as security in six months or less. But the efficiency of the process can be influenced by a number
of factors, including whether there are preferred creditors whose claims supercede a bank’s claim,
whether there is variation in enforcement on immovable assets (including receivables), and whether
the borrower is declared insolvent (see EBRD Transition Report 2003a, table A.2.2.2).
The World Bank offers a somewhat different assessment of how well commercial laws have
been implemented in terms of creditor rights. The Bank has conducted three in-depth country-level
assessments of insolvency and creditor rights, the most recent of which was an assessment of the
Czech Republic published in October 2003 (World Bank 2003). This study found that the average
time to enforce a contract by unsecured creditors was considerably longer in the Czech Republic than
in the five economies to which it was compared (Lithuania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Turkey, and
Ukraine), and somewhat longer than in the EU 15—but shorter than in the United States (Table 4). The
study also found that delays in contract enforcement in the Czech Republic left unsecured creditors
with little practical means to ensure that the debtor’s assets would be protected from dissipation or
value loss.










Time to enforce a contract (days) 270 196 252 365
Cost to enforce a contract (percentage of per
capita income)
18.5 12.6 5.9 0.4
Source: World Bank, “Czech Republic Policy Note: Insolvency  and Creditor Rights Systems”, 2003
Themost notabledifference betweenthe CzechRepublic andothercountriesis thecostof enforce-
ment. The Czech Republic compares quite unfavorably with the other countries, which themselves
compare unfavorably with the EU 15—all of which compare very unfavorably with the United States.
In addition to debt collection by unsecured creditors (outside of bankruptcy) through the court
system, the Bank report on the Czech Republic addresses two other important avenues: pursuit of
securedclaimsbysecuredcreditors (outside ofbankruptcy), andpursuitof claimsthroughbankruptcy.
Onthefirst,theBankindicatesthattherecoveryofcollateralshouldbefacilitatedbythePublicAuction
Law, because the law will likely improve discipline among lenders. The law should also improve non-
judicial auction procedures and potentially streamline the foreclosure process. But the report cautions
that if recovery by unsecured creditors is improved under the new law, it may come at the expense
of secured creditors. Moreover, the Bank notes that under Czech commercial law secured creditors
must surrender to unsecured creditors up to 30 percent of their collateral proceeds and do not enjoy
significantly stronger standing in taking security in real estate—and that the situation is even worse
for movable assets (such as receivables and inventory).
These problems would be significantly mitigated if the third avenue, bankruptcy, were favorable
for creditors. A recent EBRD report assessing bankruptcy laws in transition economies gave the Czech
Republic and three of the other EU 8 a “medium” rating (EBRD Transition Report 2003b). No transition
economy scored a “very high” rating, which would be equivalent to international best practice, and
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only five countries received a “high” rating. Three of the remaining EU 8 (Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia)
received a “low” rating and one (Lithuania) was considered “very low”—the worst rating. The average
rating for the 27 transition economies was “low.”
Though the Czech Republic’s bankruptcy laws are moderately effective, the World Bank considers
filing for bankruptcy to be the worst alternative for creditors, with unsecured creditors usually re-
ceiving little or nothing for their claims. The outlook for secured creditors is also grim, with limited
rights, long delays and no compensation for them, and collateral often sold for much less than the
creditors’ claims. As a result creditors often do not consider liquidation proceedings a viable option
for recovering debt (World Bank 2003, p. 5). Moreover, the Bank concludes that the Czech bankruptcy
law has had a detrimental effect on non- performing loans and led to a reduction in the availability
of credit.
In its report on Lithuania the Bank indicates a similar disconnect between the legal structure and its
implementation (World Bank 2002a). The Bank’s report on insolvency and creditor rights in the Slovak
Republic echoes similar themes, though it also indicates that alternative forms of finance—including
factoring—have developed to circumvent problems with bankruptcy (World Bank 2002b). These
issues are not unique to transition economies: many developed countries also have shortcomings in
bankruptcy law, particularly its implementation. Such weaknesses influence not only the resolution
of bankruptcies and the enforcement of loan contracts but also the construction of contracts, which
affects the choice of lending technologies. Further research is needed in this area.
Given the legal environment in most countries, it may be understandable that factoring is the
main type of asset-based finance. The most likely reason is property rights: with factoring, possession
of the assets passes from the debtor to the lender. As long as factoring is legally recognized as a sale
and purchase, it may be a more attractive lending technology outside Canada, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADVANCE FACTORING IN THE EU 8
AstheeconomiesoftheEU8matureandtheirbusinessandfinancialmarketsbecomemoreintegrated
with the EU internal market, the factoring industry in these countries will likely grow significantly.
Given the importance of factoring as a source of SME financing (especially short-term working
capital), governments in the EU 8 should promote the industry’s development by removing the
barriers to growth identified above. They should also address other policy issues that arise from
the industry’s structure, such as the dominance of bank-owned factoring companies in most EU 8
markets. The following steps—supported by overall improvements in the business environment to
promote financial development and improve access to financing—would help develop the factoring
industry in the EU 8.
First, EU 8 governments should strengthen creditor rights by upgrading bankruptcy and collateral
legislation and infrastructure to international best practices (as identified in World Bank Reports on
Observance of Standards and Codes for insolvency and creditor rights, referenced earlier). There are
few EU rules to guide the EU 8 in this area. Moreover, in recent years policymakers in the EU 8 have
been focused on preparing for EU accession. Both issues help explain why the remaining reform
agenda is still so large at this late stage of the transition.
Second, credit information infrastructures should be strengthened. Although governments typi-
callydonotowncommercialcreditbureaus,theycanfacilitate theirdevelopmentbyeasinglegallimits
on the sharing of debtor information and by encouraging equal access to credit information by banks
and non-bank financial institutions such as factoring and leasing companies. Upgrading accounting
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standards for SMEs—most of which still prepare their financial statements using tax reporting stan-
dards set by ministries of finance, rather than general purpose financial reporting standards designed
to clarify pertinent business and credit information—to International Financial Reporting Standards
(or a simplified version of them) would also be helpful. Estonia began requiring SMEs to use these
standards several years ago, and the successful development of its factoring industry may at least in
part be due to the high-quality financial statement information available for SMEs.
Third, while there are no strong arguments for government regulation and supervision of the
factoring industry—given that factoring companies do not take deposits—some formalization of the
activities of factoring companies would likely benefit the industry’s development.27 For example,
governments could:
• Define or refer to factoring in civil and commercial codes and other financial sector legislation.
Doing so would recognize factoring companies as legitimate financial service providers, on par
with banks and leasing companies, and make factoring companies more visible in financial circles.
• Allow factoring companies to make tax deductible provisions for bad receivables, to level the
playing field between factoring provided by bank subsidiaries or independent factors and bank
credit and factoring provided directly by banks.
Box 4. The Factoring Industry in Poland
The factoring market in Poland is expanding rapidly from a low base. In 2003, volume grew by 20% and the value
of purchased receivables reached 12.2 billion Polish Zloty (approximately $3.4 billion) (these data reflect the business
of the 9 leading domestic factoring companies and does not include other “factoring-like” products offered by some
34 banks in Poland (e.g., invoice discounting). The 9 key players on the market are:
• Pekao Faktoring—owned 100% by Pekao SA Bank (Uni Credito Italiano Group);
• Raiffeisen Faktoring—owned 100% by Raiffeisen Bank;
• Forin—company was liquidated in February 2004 and merged with Millenium Bank;
• Handlowy-Heller—owned 50% by Citibank Handlowy, 50% by ING and GE Capital;
• Polfactor—owned by BRE Bank and Intermarket AG (Austrian factoring Bank);
• Arvato Services—owned by Bertelsmann Group;
• Bibby—Factors—owned by Bibby UK—privately owned chain of factoring companies in the UK;
• BZ WBK Faktor—owned by BZ WBK Bank ( Allied Irish group); and
• Eurofactor—100% privately owned by Polish entrepreneurs.
In terms of products, the Polish factoring market still has a long way to go before it reaches maturity, as about
80–85% of factoring volume is done with recourse, with the remainder being either export factoring or domestic
factoring without recourse. Domestic factoring without recourse is offered on the basis of a contract with one of two
major foreign export credit insurance companies—either Coface or Hermes.
The future of factoring in Poland relies heavily on the development of the SME sector of the economy on the
one hand and the removal of legal and accounting/taxation barriers on the other hand. Poland has about 3.4 million
registered businesses—the largest number in Central and Eastern Europe. Over 90% of them are small and medium
sized enterprises with huge liquidity problems (only about 3% of SME say they have no problems with liquidity) and
lack of equity and current asset financing. Poland is probably the only country in the region with a rather unfavorable
legal environment for factoring. Major bottlenecks are:
• widespread use of non-assignment clauses—80% of supermarket chains are using such clauses, making financing
of receivables impossible for suppliers of many FMCG goods;
• inability to write off bad debts for factoring companies, as financed receivables cannot be booked in factors’
books as revenues;
• very poor understanding by the courts of factoring-related cases; judges, especially in the local courts, are mixing
up factoring companies with other legal entities, allowing debtors to engage in various kinds of frauds and
causing losses to factors.
Source: Handlowy-Heller.
27 For example, the Bank of Italy has perhaps gone furthest among EU financial regulators in applying prudential and
reporting requirements to factoring companies (Muschella 2003).
THE WORLD BANK 33The Role Of Factoring In the New EU Member States
• Encourage factoring companies to use the same accounting standards when preparing their
financial statements and have the statements audited using the same auditing standards that
apply to their parent owners—particularly when these owners are banks. This approach will make
it easier for factoring companies to obtain financing in capital markets and to diversify their
funding sources beyond lines of credit from their parent banks, by exploiting the credibility and
cost advantages deriving from high-quality financial statements prepared for a financial group or
holding company using uniform, preferably internationally recognized accounting and auditing
standards (such as International Financial Reporting Standards and International Standards on
Auditing).28
• Recognize the unique nature of factoring companies’ credit exposure when setting provisioning
rules for large and connected exposure limits applicable to banks and bank-owned financial sub-
sidiaries (such as factoring companies). Depending on the level and nature of recourse factoring,
the credit exposure of factoring companies is not or is not fully to the sellers of receivables (often
SMEs with limited credit history), but instead is partly or fully to the obligors of those receivables
(often larger, more established companies).
Fourth, hindrances to the development of factoring should be addressed. In Poland, for example,
80 percent of large supermarket chains use non-assignment clauses—making financing of receivables
impossible for suppliers of many fast-moving consumer goods.
Fifth, establishing domestic factoring associations and encouraging factoring companies to join
them could give the industry a voice in discussions with government authorities on policy issues facing
the industry. In more developed factoring markets such associations actively promote the interests of
factoring companies.
28 These efforts also increase the reliability of consolidated financial statements of financial groups, benefiting the
supervision of such groups in cases where they are headed by or comprise regulated entities such as banks.
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• The Register of Pledges was introduced by an amendment to the
Czech Civil Code (effective as of 1 January 2002).
• The purpose of the Register is to provide reliable evidence of the
existence of certain types of pledges.
• The Register is maintained by the Czech Notary Chamber in electronic
form and is not publicly available. Rather, a notary public issues a copy
or extract from the Register, as well as confirmation that the particular
object is not subject to a pledge, only if: (i) the requesting person
proves a justified interest; or (ii) the owner of the collateral approves
it in writing.
TYPES OF PLEDGES
• A pledge encumbered by a lien may be a movable or immovable
object, an enterprise or another collective asset, a set of objects, a re-
ceivable, or some other property right if its nature so admits, a flat
(anapartment) ornon-residential premises in ownership, asharehold-
ing in a business (an ownership interest), securities or the subject of
a specific industrial (i.e. intellectual) property right.
• A receivable can be secured by a lien on several separate objects (joint
lien).
• A lien may secure both a pecuniary and a non-pecuniary receivable.
Estonia Yes OVERVIEW
• Has a commercial pledge register. Registration of movables is regu-
lated by the Commercial Pledge Law and the Property Law.
• Database is centralized and electronic.
TYPES OF PLEDGES
• A commercial pledge extends to all movable property of a company or
movablepropertyrelatingtotheeconomicactivityofasoleproprietor.
A commercial pledge may be established on the movable property of
the Estonian branch of a foreign company.
• A commercial pledge extends to all encumberable property, which
belongs to an undertaking at the time the pledge entry is made, and
to property, which the undertaking acquires after the pledge.
• A commercial pledge does not extend to money in a cash register
or credit institution; shares, stocks, investment fund shares, contribu-
tions in co-operatives or participation in other companies belonging
to an undertaking; promissory notes or other loan documents ac-
cepted in common usage; or other securities.
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Hungary Yes OVERVIEW
• Has a modern and efficient regime for secured transactions (EBRD
2003 Transition Report).
• The Charge Registry is kept at the Hungarian National Chamber of
Public Notaries.
• The registry is accessible for anybody to inspect.
• The registry is centralized and computerized.
• The secured transaction system is defined in the Hungarian Civil Code
of 1959. Modifications of the code in 1996 amended the secured
transaction system and have led to an increased use of security over
movables. The law was further updated in September 2001.
TYPES OF PLEDGES
• The charged asset may be any tangible object, any transferable right
or claim.
• A charge on rights and receivables may be created by agreement.
• A floating charge may be created on the whole of a business associa-
tion without legal entity or on a part of it that operates as a separate
economic unit without having to define the objects, rights and receiv-
ables constituting the asset, by concluding the charge agreement in
form of a notary instrument and registering the charge in the charge
registry.
Latvia Yes OVERVIEW
• Commercial pledges are registered in the Register of Commercial
Pledges, a database on commercial pledges.
• The register is fully accessible to the public.
• The system is centralized and electronic.
TYPES OF PLEDGES
• The object of the commercial pledge may be:
• a movable tangible or intangible object which belongs to a legal
person engaged in business („enterprise” or „business company”).
• a pool of objects (as mentioned above);
• the complete assets of an enterprise.
• Aircraftandlandmechanicalmeansoftransportationandtheirtrailers
as well as an enterprise as a pool of objects; capital shares of an
enterprise; shares, stocks of a closed issue; and bonds of a closed
issue may be the object of the commercial pledge irrespective of their
ownership.
• The commercial pledge where the object is a pool of objects shall in-
clude the existing as well as future parts of the pool if it is not explicitly
clear that the intent of the pledgor of the commercial pledge has been
to pledge only the part of the pool as it was at the moment of creating
the pledge right.
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Lithuania Yes OVERVIEW
• Has a modern and efficient regime for secured transactions (EBRD
2003 Transition Report).
• Pledges are registered in the Register of Mortgages administered by
the mortgage departments of district courts.
TYPES OF PLEDGES
• Types of collateral include:
• any movable object defined by individual or species characteristics
except objects subject
• to mortgage under the Law on Mortgage;
• securities;
• intellectual property rights;
• money in the bank account of the debtor;
• rights in rem;
• rights in person arising from a written agreement.
Poland Yes OVERVIEW
• Has a Pledge Registry system.
• In Poland the pledge registries are maintained by district courts.
• The pledge registry is maintained in an electronic form and data are
accumulated nationwide.
• The system has problems of excessively long periods of processing
request in the pledge registries. The registered pledge as a form of
collateral does not significantly diminish credit risk. In fact, the long
processing times may even contribute to/create higher risk.
TYPES OF PLEDGES
• The collateral may be any movable object or property right which is
transferable. In particular, a registered pledge may encumber:
• objects which may be specifically identified,
• objects identified as to type, if in the pledge agreement their quan-
tity or means for differentiating them from other objects of the
same type is specified,
• a collection of movable objects or rights constituting an economic
entity, even though the individual object may be replaceable,
• claims,
• intellectual property rights,
• rights from securities.
• A registered pledge may also encumber objects or rights, which the
pledgor [debtor] is to acquire in the future. In such case the encum-
brance of these objects or rights shall be effective at the moment title
is acquired by the pledgor [debtor].




• Has a modern and efficient regime for secured transactions (EBRD
2003 Transition Report). System considered one of the best in Europe.
• Registration is made in the new Charges Register operated by the
Slovak Chamber of Notaries.
• The register is maintained in a single electronic database. Registration
is made instantly via a terminal in a notary’s office.
TYPES OF PLEDGES
• Under the new law, any legal or physical person can give a charge
over its assets (objects, residential or non-residential property, rights
or other assets) in favor of any creditor, to secure his own or another
person’s debt. The charge can be taken over any single or collective
object, right or asset that is capable of being transferred. This may
include:
• movable assets,
• land and buildings,
• rights and receivables,
• or even a group of assets, which is constantly changing, such as
inventory, trade receivables, stocks of raw materials or an entire
enterprise.
• It may also include assets to be acquired in the future. The fruits
of the collateral are included until they become separated unless
otherwise agreed.
Slovenia No OVERVIEW
• This area is currently under reform. There is no public register to allow
tracking of priorities and to alert third parties of an existing charge,
although the Law on Enforcement provides for a register, which is to
be developed by the Chamber of Notaries.
TYPES OF PLEDGES
• Only charges on motor vehicles are currently registered with the Min-
istry of Interior on the basis of an agreement with the Chamber of
Notaries.
Source: EBRD Regional Survey of Secured Transaction Laws, national country websites, and national civil codes and laws
on property rights, pledges and secured transactions.
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